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WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the survey period, September 1, 1987, through August 31,
1989, three workers' compensation acts governed workers' compensation
cases.' This survey will discuss the three acts and appellate court interpretations of those acts. The survey covers scope of coverage, requirements for compensation, appellate review, attorney fees, the
Subsequent Injury Act and the Occupational Disease Disablement Law.
II.

SCOPE OF COVERAGE

New Mexico's Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) requires most
businesses which employ three or more workers to provide workers'
compensation insurance or be subject to civil liability. 2 Employers of
private domestic servants and farm and ranch laborers are expressly
excepted.' One case decided during the survey period addressed an issue
of first impression: under what circumstances may an employer terminate
coverage which is strictly voluntary.
In Castillo v. Weatherly,4 plaintiff was injured when he fell from a
haystack while working at a dairy. 5 Prior to the accident, the employer
had elected coverage under the Act, purchased insurance, and notified
his employees that they were covered. 6 A dairy, however, does not have
to participate as an insured employer. 7 Later, the employer allowed his
compensation coverage to expire but gave no written notice to his
employees. 8 The employer, however, alleged that verbal notice was given. 9
The court of appeals held that an employer who elects to purchase
workers' compensation coverage and then allows that coverage to lapse

1. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-1 to -6-25 (Repl. Pamp. 1987 and Cum. Supp. 1989); Act approved
Feb. 21, 1986, ch. 22, 1986 N.M. Laws 525-629 (effective dates July 1, 1986 [§§ 1, 26-30, and 76]
and Dec. 1, 1986 [§§ 2, 8-12, 14, 19-25, 31-45, 47-52, 54-74, and 77])(Interim Act); Act approved
March 13, 1959, ch. 67, 1959 N.M. Laws 196-22 (effective date July 1, 1959).
2. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-2 and -6 (Repl. Pamp. 1987 and Cum. Supp. 1989). The state,
each county, municipality, school district, drainage, irrigation or conservatory district, public institution and administrative board thereof, charitable organization, private person, and firm must
cover workers. Id. § 55-1-2.
3. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-6(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1987 and Cum. Supp. 1989). These employers,
as well as others, may elect coverage under the Act. Id. § 52-1-6(B).
4. 107 N.M. 135, 753 P.2d 1323 (Ct. App. 1988).
5. Id. at 136, 753 P.2d at 1324.
6. Id. at 137, 753 P.2d at 1325.
7. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-6(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1987); Varela v. Mounho, 92 N.M. 147, 584
P.2d 194 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324 (1978).
8. Castillo, 107 N.M. at 137, 753 P.2d at 1325. The employer had elected to be covered by
the Act by a filing which certified coverage until May 12, 1985. Id. The plaintiff was injured on
January 6, 1985. A second alleged incident occurred on March 14, 1985. Id. at 136, 753 P.2d at
1324. At some time after June 14, 1984, the employer permitted the insurance policy to lapse. Id.
at 137, 753 P.2d at 1325.
9. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

must give thirty days prior written notice that the coverage has been
terminated to all employees and the superintendent of insurance.' 0 Under
the Act, any agreement between an employer and an employee to be
bound by the Act may be terminated with thirty days written notice
prior to any accidental injury." The court, therefore, held that mere
lapse of the insurance policy and oral notice of termination are insuf2
ficient to terminate the employer's elective coverage.'
III.
A.

REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPENSATION

Exclusive Remedy
A statutory workers' compensation scheme generally provides a worker

his exclusive means of recovery for an on-the-job injury. 3 The exclusive
remedy provision prohibits an injured worker from bringing a claim
for work-related personal injury or death against a fellow worker, the
employer, or the employer's workers' compensation carrier. 4 Prior to
1988, New Mexico allowed an injured worker to recover only under
the Act.'5
6
The courts decided six exclusive remedy cases during the survey period.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-6(B), -13 (Repl. Pamp. 1987)).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-13 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
Castillo, 107 N.M. at 137, 753 P.2d at 1325.
See 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 65.00 to 65.60 (1978).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-6(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1989) provides:
Such compliance with the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, including
the provisions for insurance, shall be, and construed to be, a surrender by the
employer and the employee to any other method, form or amount of compensation
or determination thereof or to any cause of action at law, suit in equity or statutory
or common-law right to remedy or proceeding whatever for or on account of such
personal injuries or death of such employee than as provided in the Workers'
Compensation Act and shall be an acceptance of all the provisions of the Workers'
Compensation Act and shall bind the employee himself and, for compensation for
his death, shall bind his personal representative, his surviving spouse and next of
kin, as well as the employer and those conducting his business during bankruptcy
or insolvency. Nothing in the Workers' Compensation Act, however, shall affect,
in any way, the existence of any claim or cause of action which the worker has
against any person other than his employer or another employee of his employer,
including a management or supervisory employee, or the insurer, guarantor or surety
of his employer.
15. See Gonzales v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 99 N.M. 432, 659 P.2d 318 (Ct.
App. 1983) (a worker had no independent cause of action against an insurer who allegedly acted
in bad faith by coercing the worker to accept a disfavorable compensation settlement); Dickson v.
Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 98 N.M. 479, 650 P.2d 1 (1982) (denied recovery against a
compensation carrier for bad faith refusal to pay an employee's medical expenses); Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Montoya, 91 N.M. 788, 581 P.2d 1283 (1978) (a worker struck in the head
with a night stick by a security guard had no tort claim against his employer for negligently hiring
the guard). These cases were decided prior to the enactment of N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-16-30
(Repl. Pamp. 1988) which explicitly grants a private right of action for bad faith.
16. Russell v. Protective Ins. Co., 107 N.M. 9, 751 P.2d 693 (1988); Shores v. Charter Services,
Inc., 106 N.M. 569, 746 P.2d 1101 (1987); Montney v. State ex rel. State Highway Dep't, 108
N.M. 326, 772 P.2d 360 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 197, 769 P.2d 731 (1989); Garcia v.
Smith Pipe & Steel Co., 107 N.M. 808, 765 P.2d 1176 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 673,
763 P.2d 689 (1988); Salswedel v. Enerpharm, Ltd., 107 N.M. 728, 764 P.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1988);
Redhouse v. Public Serv. Co., 107 N.M. 389, 758 P.2d 803 (Ct. App. 1988).
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In Russell v. Protective Insurance Co., 1" the employee, Richard Russell,
filed a complaint stating that Protective Insurance Co. (Protective)
refused "to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and
equitable settlement of his workers' compensation claim."'" Protective
filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the exclusivity provision of the
Workers' Compensation Act precluded Russell's claim. 9 The trial court
denied Protective's motion but granted leave to file an interlocutory
appeal. 20 The court of appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed
Russell's bad faith claim, holding that the exclusivity provisions of the
Act precluded an injured worker from suing an insurer
for its bad faith
2
refusal to settle a workers' compensation claim. '
The supreme court addressed two issues. First, the court addressed
whether the Trade Practices and Frauds article (Article 16) of the
Insurance Code 22 created a private right of action for an insured against23
an insurer who refuses in bad faith to pay compensation benefits.
Second, the court considered whether a worker may be an insured under
Article 16.24
The supreme court ruled in Russell's favor on both issues. In finding
a private right of action, the court specifically addressed the interrelationship between Article 16 and the interim Workers' Compensation
Act. The court held that when the legislature enacted Article 16 it
intended to broaden the Workers' Compensation Act so as to create a
private right of action for an insured against an insurer who refuses,
in bad faith, to pay compensation benefits. 25 However, that private
right of action only arises from an intentional, willful refusal to pay
benefits, not from a negligent or dilatory refusal to pay. The Workers'
Compensation Act
itself provides a remedy for a negligent or dilatory
26
refusal to pay.
The court held that an employee was a third-party beneficiary to his
employer's workers' compensation insurance contract thereby rejecting

17. 107 N.M. 9, 751 P.2d 693. In Russell, the supreme court reconsidered and withdrew an
earlier opinion on the same case. Id. at 10, 751 P.2d at 694. Although Russell was decided under
the Interim Act, its holdings should remain in force. A complete discussion of Russell and its
impact will appear in the next issue of the New Mexico Law Review.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 11, 751 P.2d at 695.
22. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59A-16-1 to -30 (Repl. Pamp. 1988). Section 59A-16-30 provides a
private right of action to "[a]ny person covered by [Article 16] who has suffered damages as a
result of a violation of Article 16 of the Insurance Code by an insurer or agent." The relief "is
in addition to remedies otherwise available against the same conduct under the common law or
other statutes of this state." Id. § 59A-16-30.
23. Russell, 107 N.M. at 10, 751 P.2d at 694.
24. Id. at 12, 751 P.2d at 696. Section 59A-16-20(E) specifies an insured is covered under the
article for violation of unfair claims practices. Specifically, the section provides that prohibited
practices by insurers include "not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable
settlements of an insured'sclaims in which liability has become reasonably clear." (Emphasis added.)
25. Russell, 107 N.M. at 11, 751 P.2d at 695.
26. Id. at 12, 751 P.2d at 696.
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Protective's contention that only an employer is a named insured for
purposes of Article 16.27 The court first noted that a section of Article
16 equates a "claimant" with an "insured. ' 2 Accordingly, the supreme
court reasoned that the legislature intended to expand the protection
of Article 16 beyond those parties who have signed the insurance contract. 29 Second, the court stated that courts have expanded contract law
beyond the traditional, strict limitations of privity of contract.30 Third,
the terms of the contract did not limit Russell's status as a third-party
beneficiary since "the paramount indicator of third party beneficiary
status is a showing that the parties to the contract intended to benefit
the third party, either individually or as a member of a class of beneficiaries." "'
In Montney v. State ex rel. State Highway Department,32 the court
of appeals considered whether a state employee may be entitled to both
workers' compensation benefits and benefits under the State Public
Employees Retirement Act (PERA). 33 Montney was working as a mechanic and equipment operator for the State Highway Department when
he jumped from a dump truck and severely injured his left knee. 34 The
district court awarded Montney compensation benefits of $208.60 per
week for 600 weeks but gave the State Highway Department a credit
of $450.07 per month for each month Montney would receive PERA
disability retirement benefits."a
Citing the absence of a specific statutory provision, the court of
appeals disallowed an offset in workers' compensation benefits for PERA
benefits the worker received.3 6 In so ruling, the court of appeals distinguished Montney from Carter v. Mountain Bell.3 7 In Carter, the court
allowed an offset against the employer's private benefits plan for those
benefits obtained under workers' compensation insurance, even though
the Workers' Compensation Act did not expressly allow the setoff.3"
In Carter, the language of the private benefit plan itself provided for

27. Id. at 13, 751 P.2d at 697.
28. Id. The court used as an example section 59A-16-20(J) which includes as an unfair trade
practice "making known to insured or claimants a practice of insurer of appealing from arbitration
awards in favor of insured or claimants for the purpose of compelling them to accept settlements
or compromises less than the amount awarded in arbitration." (Emphasis added.)
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. (quoting Valdez v. Cillessen & Son, 105 N.M. 575, 581, 734 P.2d 1258, 1264 (1987)).
32. 108 N.M. 326, 772 P.2d 360 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 197, 769 P.2d 731 (1989).
33. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-11-1 to -140 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
34. Montney, 108 N.M. at 327, 772 P.2d at 361.
35. Id. at 328, 772 P.2d at 362.
36. Id. at 328-29, 772 P.2d at 362-63.
37. 105 N.M. 17, 727 P.2d 956 (Ct. App. 1986). Plaintiff Geraldine Carter worked for Mountain
Bell which carried its own "Sickness and Accident Disability Benefit Plan." The plan provided that
an employee could not receive both sickness and accident benefits at the same time. The plan also
provided that any workers' compensation benefits would be deducted from those benefits provided
by the plan. The trial court allowed Mountain Bell to deduct the amount of Carter's workers'
compensation benefits from the benefits owed her under the "Sickness and Accident Disability
Benefit Plan." Id. at 19, 727 P.2d at 958.
38. Montney, 108 N.M. at 329, 772 P.2d at 363.
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a setoff.3 9 In Montney, the court found no statutory requirement for
an offset or some other method to avoid overlapping or double payments
40
of benefits under both PERA and the Workers' Compensation Act.

The court declined to require an offset by judicial construction. 4 I
In Salswedel v. Enerpharm, Ltd. ,42 the court of appeals considered
whether the "dual persona" doctrine presents another exception to the
exclusive remedy provision of the Act. Salswedel worked for Nuclear

Pharmacy, one of three partners comprising Enerpharm, Ltd. 43 While
she was walking in the parking lot Nuclear rented from Enerpharm,
the plaintiff slipped on layers of ice formed because of Enerpharm's
alleged negligence. 4
At trial, Enerpharm pointed to the exclusivity provision of the Work-

ers' Compensation Act 45 and claimed that Salswedel's only remedy lay
in a workers' compensation claim.4 6 Salswedel argued that the Workers'
Compensation Act itself contemplates an exception to the exclusivity
provision.4 7 Salswedel maintained she had a negligence action against
Enerpharm because Enerpharm was a "person other than [her] employer." ' 4 The trial court granted summary judgment against Salswedel

because it believed the employer, Nuclear Pharmacy, and the partnership,
Enerpharm, were essentially the same. 49 The court of appeals reversed,

remanding the case for further findings on Salswedel's relationship with
Enerpharm and Enerpharm's relationship with Nuclear Pharmacy.50
The court outlined three analyses necessary to a determination of
whether Salswedel could bring a negligence action against Enerpharm.1'
First, the trial court must determine whether an employment relationship
existed between Salswedel and Enerpharm.5 2 If an employment relationship existed, the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation

39. Id.
40. Id. at 330, 772 P.2d at 364. The court found no requirement to offset PERA benefits from
workers' compensation benefits under PERA or under the Workers' Compensation Act. Id. Under
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-65 (Repl. Pamp. 1987), benefits awarded under the workers' compensation
law of other jurisdictions are to be credited to benefits the worker is entitled to under New Mexico's
Act. Under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-70 (Repl. Pamp. 1987), benefits received for unemployment
compensation offset benefits the worker is entitled to for total disability under New Mexico's
Workers' Compensation Act.
41. Montney, 108 N.M. at 330, 772 P.2d at 364.
42. 107 N.M. 728, 764 P.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1988).
43. Id. at 729, 764 P.2d at 500.
44. Id.
45. The exclusive remedy provision only bars claims against a worker's employer, a fellow
employee, or insurer. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-6(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
46. Salswedel, 107 N.M. at 729, 764 P.2d at 500.
47. Id. at 730, 764 P.2d at 501. Salswedel pointed to the following language: "Nothing in the
... Act, however, shall affect or be construed to affect, in any way, the existence of or the mode
of trial of any claim or cause of action which the worker has against any person other than his
employer." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-6(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
48. Salswedel, 107 N.M. at 729, 764 P.2d at 500 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-6(D) (Repl.
Pamp. 1987)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 733, 764 P.2d at 504.
51. Id. at 732-33, 764 P.2d at 503-04.
52. Id. at 730, 764 P.2d at 501.
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Act would bar the suit.53 In determining the relationship, the trial court
should consider "whether Enerpharm had a right to control [Salswedel's]
right in [Salswedel]
performance and whether there was a corresponding
'54
to seek remuneration from Enerpharm.
Because a partnership is only liable for the commission of a tort by
a member partner or other agent, a third inquiry is necessary. 55 The
court stated that although the claim alleged a tortious act by the
partnership, Salswedel "is actually asserting negligence on the part of
an agent of the partnership, which may be imputed to the other
partners." ' 56 If the negligence is attributable to Nuclear Pharmacy, the
partner-employer, then the trial court must determine whether Enerpharm
derives immunity under the Workers' Compensation Act from Nuclear
57

Pharmacy .

Derivative immunity first depends on the immunity of Nuclear Pharmacy. 58 Nuclear Pharmacy may not be immune under the "dual persona"
doctrine. 59 Under this doctrine, "an employer may become a third person,
vulnerable to a tort suit by an employee, if, and only if, he possesses
a second persona completely independent from and unrelated to his

status as an employer."0
Derivative immunity also depends on whether the immunity of the
partner extends to the partnership. 61 Immunity does not extend from
the individual partner to the partnership. 62 Immunity will not extend
under the "dual persona" doctrine to a legal entity separate from the
employer and without a reasonable expectation of immunity. 63 Immunity
may extend to the partnership, however, when the partnership is the
alter ego of the employer partner. 64
exclusivity
Other cases during the survey period upheld the 6traditional
5
of the Workers' Compensation Act as a remedy.

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 730-31, 764 P.2d at 501-02 (citing Gatley v. Detero, 128 Misc. 2d 209, 489 N.Y.S.2d
684 (1985); Uniform Partnership Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-1-13 (Repl. Pamp. 1988)).
56. Id. at 731-32, 764 P.2d at 502-03.
57. Id. at 730, 764 P.2d at 501.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 731, 764 P.2d at 502.
60. Id. (citing Henning v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 143 Wis. 2d 1, 419 N.W.2d 551 (1988);
2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 72.81(a) (1988)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 732, 764 P.2d at 503 (citing Mathews v. Wosek, 44 Mich. App. 706, 205 N.W.2d

813 (1973); Eule v. Eule Motor Sales, 34 N.J. 537, 170 A.2d 241 (1961);
OF AGENCY

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)

§ 217(b) (1958) (a principal is not entitled to rely on the immunity of its agent)).

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Garcia v. Smith Pipe & Steel Co., 107 N.M. 808, 765 P.2d 1176 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
107 N.M. 673, 763 P.2d 689 (1988) (temporary help service's purchase of coverage at the expense
of an employer suffices to invoke the protection of the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers'
Compensation Act); Redhouse v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 107 N.M. 389, 758 P.2d 803 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 107 N.M. 308, 756 P.2d 1203 (1988) (a worker is not entitled to both paid accident
leave and workers' compensation benefits); Shores v. Charter Serv., Inc., 106 N.M. 569, 746 P.2d
1101 (1987) (an employer's failure to comply with the Act does not allow the worker both a workers'
compensation action and an action for common law remedies).
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B.

Accidental Injury
New Mexico's Workers' Compensation Act makes an employer liable
for an employee's accidental injury. 66 An "accidental injury" need not
be sudden but may arise without the usually attending factors of 67
a
narrow time frame between the beginning and completion of the injury.
An accidental injury is distinguishable, however, from an occupational
disease. 68 Traditionally, the term "accidental injury"
was liberally con69
strued in favor of the compensation claimant.
One case during the survey period addressed accidental injury. In
Cisneros v. Molycorp,70 the employee worked at the Molycorp plant
for 31 years and was exposed to frequent, continuous, excessive noise.
The court of appeals held that Cisneros' gradual, noise-induced hearing
loss was a compensable accidental injury. 71 The court adopted a foreseeability test, allowing for recovery for accidental injuries if either
the cause or effect of the injury was unexpected. 72 In so doing, the
court rejected the test of other jurisdictions requiring 73the worker to
prove the specific time, place, and cause of his injury.
C.

Arising Out Of and In Course Of Employment
For an accidental injury to be compensable, the Act requires that the
claim arise out of and in the course of a worker's employment.7 4 "Arising

66. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1987) provides:
[Every employer] shall become liable to and shall pay to any ... worker injured
by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and, in case of
his death being occasioned thereby, to such person as may be authorized by the
director or appointed by a court to receive the same for the benefit of his dependents,
compensation in the manner and amount at the times herein required.
67. Aranbula v. Banner Mining Co., 49 N.M. 253, 257, 161 P.2d 867, 869 (1945).
68. An occupation or industry disease is one which arises from causes incident to the
profession or labor of the party's occupation or calling. It has its origin in the
inherent nature or mode of work of the profession or industry, and it is the usual
result or concomitant. If, therefore, a disease is not a customary or natural result
of the profession or industry, per se, but is the consequence of some extrinsic
condition or independent agency, the disease or injury cannot be imputed to the
occupation or industry, and it is in no accurate sense an occupation or industry
disease.
Id. at 257, 161 P.2d at 869 (quoting Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Francks, 147 Md. 368,
128 A. 635 (Ct. App. 1925)).
69. Gilbert v. E.B. Law & Son, 60 N.M. 101, 287 P.2d 992 (1955). Under the current Act the
courts may no longer liberally construe the Workers' Compensation Act. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §
52-2-1 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
70. 107 N.M. 788, 765 P.2d 761 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 785, 765 P.2d 758 (1988).
For a discussion of this case in the context of the Occupational Disease Disablement Law, see infra
notes 425-32 and accompanying text.
71. Id. at 790, 765 P.2d at 763.
72. Id. at 792, 765 P.2d at 765.
73. Id.
74. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-28(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1987) provides: "Claims for workers' compensation shall be allowed only: (1) when the worker has sustained an accidental injury arising out
of and in the course of employment; (2) when the accident was reasonably incident to his employment;
and (3) when the disability is a natural and direct result of the accident." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 521-19 (Repl. Pamp. 1987) provides:
As used in the Workers' Compensation Act [Chapter 52, Article I NMSA 19781,
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out of" means the injury resulted from a risk reasonably incident to
the claimant's work." "Course of employment" means the injury occurred in the time, place and circumstances of the
claimant's employ77

ment. 76 Both of these requirements must be met.

The courts addressed the scope of these two separate requirements
in several cases during the survey period. 7s The cases concerning whether

an injury meets the limitations of "arising out of" and "course of
employment" indicate the results are fact dependent and vary from case
to case. These cases have not changed the previous definitions of "arising
out of" and "course of employment" but have augmented those def-

initions with situational and evidentiary refinements.
In Kloer v. Municipality of Las Vegas, 79 the court of appeals held
that a worker's injuries from a heart attack, which occurred while the
worker was playing basketball on the employer's premises during lunch
break, arose out of and in the course of employment. The employer
knew of and encouraged the basketball playing.80 The court found that
the death was a compensable injury since it satisfied both the "arising
out of" and "course of employment" requirements . 8 A recreational
activity satisfies the "arising out of" requirement when the activity is
"part of the working conditions of the particular place of employment,
8' 2
and a risk the employee is exposed to by virtue of his employment.
Basketball playing was a risk of employment because it was an accepted
and established feature of the workplace, acquiesced in and condoned
by the employer. 83
The court adopted a three prong test to analyze whether an injury
has occurred in the course of employment. 84 The injury must take "place

unless the context otherwise requires, "injury by accident arising out of and in the
course of employment" shall include accidental injuries to workers and death resulting
from accidental injury as a result of their employment and while at work in any
place where their employer's business requires their presence but shall not include
injuries to any worker occurring while on his way to assume the duties of his
employment or after leaving such duties, the proximate cause of which is not the
employer's negligence.
75. E.g., Losinski v. Drs. Corcoran, Barkoff, & Stagnone, P.A., 97 N.M. 79, 80, 636 P.2d
898, 890 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 97 N.M. 483, 641 P.2d 514 (1981).
76. E.g., Velkovitz v. Penasco Indep. School Dist., 96 N.M. 577, 633 P.2d 685 (1981).
77. Velkovitz, 96 N.M. 577, 633 P.2d 685; Losinski, 97 N.M. 79, 80-81, 636 P.2d 898, 899900.
78. Mortgage Inv. Co. of El Paso v. Griego, 108 N.M. 240, 771 P.2d 173 (1989); Oliver v.
City of Albuquerque, 106 N.M. 350, 742 P.2d 1055 (1987); Urioste v. Sideris, 107 N.M. 733, 764
P.2d 504 (Ct. App. 1988); Kloer v. Municipality of Las Vegas, 106 N.M. 594, 746 P.2d 1126 (Ct.
App. 1987).
79. 106 N.M. 594, 746 P.2d 1126 (Ct. App. 1987).
80. Id.at 595, 746 P.2d at 1127.
81. Id. at 597, 746 P.2d at 1129. In Kloer, the court stated that the judicial approach in New
Mexico is to liberally construe the Act toward expanding, rather than constricting, compensability.
Id. at 596, 746 P.2d at 1128.
82. Id.
83. Id.City funds paid for the backboard and rim which the city installed on a city building.
The city also fenced in the basketball court and kept basketballs for its employees' use during
breaks. Id. at 595, 746 P.2d at 1127.
84. Id. at 597, 746 P.2d at 1129 (citing McNamara v. Town of Hamden, 176 Conn. 547, 398
A.2d 1161 (1979)).
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within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may
reasonably be, and while the employee is reasonably fulfilling the duties
of employment or doing something incidental to it." 8 Basketball playing
was incidental to Kloer's employment duties because of his employer's
acquiescence and thea6regularity of the activity on the employer's premises
during work hours.
In Urioste v. Sideris,8 7 the court of appeals held that an insulation
installer's injury, which occurred while the installer was helping plumbers
to lift a bathtub, arose out of the worker's employment. The plumbers
were not employed by the claimant's employer, but the plumbers asked
the claimant to help them move the tub.8 8 There was testimony that,
on other occasions, the employer had instructed the worker to help
plumbers. 89 Further, the employer's work was a rush job requiring the
worker to do whatever was necessary to complete the work and he
could not complete his work until the plumbers were done.9
The court stated that if the ultimate effect of an employee's work
advances his employer's interest and the employee is not specifically
prohibited from assisting nonemployees, then the injury suffered while
helping others is compensable. 9' Because assisting the plumbers enabled
the worker to finish his employer's work sooner and the worker was
92
not prohibited from doing such, the injury arose out of the employment.
In Mortgage Investment Co. of El Paso v. Griego,93 the supreme
court held that the death of a worker who was shot in his office did
not "arise out of" his employment.9 4 In Griego, the decedent's office
was not in a high crime area and no motive for his death was known.9 5
There is no indication that the claimant offered any evidence establishing
the death was caused
by a risk incidental to or that it arose out of
96
the employment.
Generally, under workers' compensation law, there is a presumption
that the death arose out of the employment, where there is no evidence
of cause of death and the death happened at the place of work during
the period of employment. 97 Under the Rules of Evidence,98 however,

85. Id.
86. Id. at 597, 746 P.2d at 1129.
87. 107 N.M. 733, 764 P.2d 504 (Ct. App. 1988).
88. Id. at 735, 764 P.2d at 506.
89. Id. at 736, 764 P.2d at 507.
90. Id.
91. Id.; cf. IA A. LAsON, Ti LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 27.20 (1985) (when a
worker removes obstacles in furtherance of the employer's work, it should not matter that the
beneficiary is a complete stranger).
92. See Urioste, 107 N.M. at 736, 764 P.2d at 507.
93. 108 N.M. 240, 771 P.2d 173 (1989).
94. The parties stipulated that the death occurred in the course of employment. Id. at 243, 771
P.2d at 176.
95. Id. at 242, 771 P.2d at 175.
96. Id.
97. Ensley v. Grace, 76 N.M. 691, 695, 417 P.2d 885, 887 (1966); IA A. LARSON, THE LAW
OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 10.32 (1985).
98. Sup. CT. RuLEs ANN. 11-301 (Recomp.

1986) (formerly N.M.

STAT. ANN.

1978, R. Evid.
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a presumption does not shift the burden of persuasion. 99 Even if the
presumption is not rebutted, the claimant must produce sufficient credible evidence to meet the burden of persuasion that the death arose
out of the employment. 1°° The court held that the claimant failed to
meet the burden of persuasion that the death was from a risk incidental

to the employment and therefore "arose out of" the employment. 0 1
D.

Causal Connection

In addition to the requirements that accidental injuries arise out of
and in the course of employment, the disability must be a natural and
direct result of the accident.o ° The issue of whether there is a causal

connection between a disability and the accident may arise when the
employer or his insurance carrier denies that "an alleged disability is
a natural and direct result of the accident."' 0 3 Under section 52-1-28(B)
of the Act, a claimant must establish through expert medical testimony
that an alleged disability is the result of a work-related accident and
is causally connected to the accident. 1°4
In Oliver v. City of Albuquerque,0 5 the supreme court considered

the relationship between causal connection and the requirement that the
accident arise out of and in the course of employment. In Oliver, a

fireman suffered a fatal heart attack in his sleep while he and his fire
company were on alert, backing up another company that was called
to extinguish a fire.' °6 At the trial, the causal connection between jobinduced stress and the fireman's heart attack was established by competent medical testimony. 0 7

301 (Repl. Pamp. 1983)) states:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by statute or by
these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does
not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion,
which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
This rule is more fully discussed in the context of Griego in Survey, Evidence, 20 N.M.L. Rv.
329, 339-40 (1990) (this issue).
99. Griego, 108 N.M. at 244, 771 P.2d at 177.
100. Id. at 240, 771 P.2d at 173.
101. Id. at 244-45, 771 P.2d at 177-78. The claimant is required to show that the injury was
caused by a risk the worker was reasonably subjected to during his employment. Id. at 242, 771
P.2d at 175.
102. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-28(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1987). The statute also requires that the accident
be "reasonably incident" to the worker's employment. Id.
103. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-28(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1987) provides:
In all cases where the employer or his insurance carrier deny that an alleged disability
is a natural and direct result of the accident, the worker must establish that causal
connection as a probability by expert testimony of a health care provider, as defined
in Section 52-4-1 NMSA 1978, testifying within the area of his expertise.
The issue of whether there is a causal connection also arises when an employer alleges that a
worker misrepresented his physical condition on his employment application. See Tallman v. ABF
(Arkansas Best Freight), 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363, cert. denied, 109 N.M. 33, 781 P.2d 305
(1988), discussed infra at notes 325-48 and accompanying text.
104. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-28(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
105. 106 N.M. 350, 742 P.2d 1055 (1987).
106. Id. at 351, 742 P.2d at 1056.
107. Id.
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The court stated in dictum that when the causal connection between
the death and the job-induced stress is established by competent medical
testimony under section 52-1-28(B), it is then unnecessary to determine
whether the death arose out of and in the course of employment under
section 52-1-28(A).10 8 The court, however, based its opinion on abundant
evidence that stress, specifically related to decedent's job, induced the
heart attack that caused his death.'0 9 The court also noted the unrebutted
presumption that a worker's death arises out of his employment." 0
Furthermore, the requirement that the injury arose in the course of
employment was satisfied when an unexpected injury occurred while,
as in this case, the worker was on duty."' Thus, the death of a fireman
by a heart attack caused by job-induced stress while sleeping on duty
was compensable under the Act.
In two other cases, Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight)"2 and
Nunez v. Smith's Management Corp.," 3 the courts addressed additional
issues concerning the causal connection between the accident and the
disability. In Tallman, the claimant, Tallman, had a preexisting congenital back problem, first diagnosed in 1977.114 In September 1986,
Tallman was diagnosed as having a disk protrusion which resulted from
his continual lifting as a dock worker." 5 The doctor, however, could
not find a definite point in time when the spinal disk ruptured."16 The
employer argued two points. First, the medical testimony and "medical
causation" did not set a specific time for when the worker suffered a
bulging disk. 1 7 Second, no competent medical testimony indicated that
the bulging disk, as opposed to a congenital problem, rendered the
worker disabled." 8
In answering the first issue, the court of appeals upheld the hearing
officer's finding which set the date of disability at the time the doctor
discovered the bulging disk from a CT scan, after which the worker
could not return to work." 9 The doctor's testimony also established as
a medical probability that the injury was caused by continuous lifting

108. Id. The court was concerned that the court of appeals consistently first approved the medical
testimony that job-related stress caused the heart attack and then questioned whether the stress was
specifically job-related. Id. at 351-52, 742 P.2d at 1056-57. The court broadly stated that when an
employer denies that a disability is a consequence of an accident, "then it is pointless to proceed
backwards to a determination of the requirements" that the injuries arose out of and in the course
of employment and that the accident was reasonably incident to the employment. Id. at 351, 742
P.2d at 1056.
109. Id. at 352, 742 P.2d at 1057.
110. Id.
111. Id. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
112. 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 33, 781 P.2d 305 (1988).
113. 108 N.M. 186, 769 P.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1988).
114. 108 N.M. at 126, 767 P.2d at 365.
115. Id. at 130-31, 767 P.2d at 369-70.
116. Id. at 131, 767 P.2d at 370.
117. Id. at 130, 767 P.2d at 369.
118. Id. at 131, 767 P.2d at 370.
119. Id.
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at the worker's job. 20 The court reasoned that the worker's disability
from continuous lifting was similar to an injury which is gradual,
progressive and not immediately obvious, so that the precise date would
be uncertain.' 2' In such a situation, the cause and manifestation of the
injury need not be simultaneous events. 122 As such, the date of the
work-related accidental injury will
be the date of diagnosis or the date
123
that the injury becomes known.
In answering the second issue, whether the bulging disk injury or the
congenital problem disabled the claimant, the court reasoned that once
a causal connection between the accidental injury and the disability is
established, it does not matter if a preexisting injury may have contributed to the ultimate disability. 2 4 The underlying theory for allowing
compensation for a work-related accident when the worker had a preexisting impairment is the employer takes the employee as he finds
him. 25 The court held that Tallman's preexisting impairment, separate
126
from and aggravated by the accidental injury, did not prevent recovery.
In Nunez, the court of appeals addressed the effect of ambiguous
medical testimony as support for a finding of causal connection. 27 In
Nunez, a worker claimed he fell and struck his shoulder on a knife
sharpener at his place of employment in February 1985.121 One doctor
who testified for the worker stated the worker "could have injured
himself in such a fall" and the pain "probably was from an injury
such as a fall.' ' 29 Generally, when the employer denies the "causal
connection," uncontradicted medical opinion based on facts is conclusive
evidence. 13 0 The court of appeals upheld the hearing officer's finding
that the worker failed to meet his burden of proving causal connection. 3 '
The court ruled that ambiguous testimony is an exception to the uncontradicted medical testimony rule.3 2 When there is ambiguous medical
testimony, the court is not bound to accept it.' Also, a factfinder is
not bound by a medical expert's opinion if the factfinder did not accept

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 1 A. LARSON, TBE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 12.21 (1989); see also
v. Ruidoso Racing Ass'n, 69 N.M. 248, 365 P.2d 671 (1961).
126. Tallman, 108 N.M. at 131, 767 P.2d at 370; see also Reynolds, 69 N.M. 248,
671; Christensen v. Dysart, 42 N.M. 107, 76 P.2d 1 (1938).
127. 108 N.M. at 188-90, 769 P.2d at 101-03.
128. Id. at 187, 769 P.2d at 100.
129. Id. at 189, 769 P.2d at 102.
130. Id. at 188, 769 P.2d at 101 (quoting Ross v. Sayers Well Servicing Co., 76 N.M.
414 P.2d 679, 683 (1966)).
131. Nunez, 108 N.M. at 190, 769 P.2d at 103.
132. Id. at 189, 769 P.2d at 102 (citing Hernandez v. Mead Foods, 104 N.M. 67, 716
(Ct. App. 1986)).
133. Id.

Reynolds
365 P.2d

321, 326,
P.2d 645
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the factual basis of the opinion.3 4 Furthermore, in Nunez, other medical
testimony contradicted the proposition that the disability resulted from
a February 1985 accident.'3 5
The cases concerning establishment of causal connection by expert
medical testimony indicate that the court will liberally construe some
requirements, such as date of disability, 3 6 but will strictly construe the
requirement of establishing causal connection by medical testimony. 3 7
Also, the probability of causal connection cannot be supported by

ambiguous medical testimony. 38
E. Safety Devices

New Mexico's Workers' Compensation Act provides for a ten percent
reduction of benefits when an employee fails to use safety devices
provided by his employer.' 3 9 To invoke this defense, the device must
be one generally used in the particular industry' 40 and must be tangible
and concrete.' 4' One case during the survey period raised a procedural
issue concerning an award for failure to use a safety device.
Cisneros v. Molycorp, 42 involved a worker whose hearing was impaired
54.96 percent due to almost thirty years of continuous exposure to noise
at the Molycorp Plant. 43 Molycorp supplied hearing protection for its
employees which Cisneros did not use.'" Molycorp did not raise the

134. Id. There was testimony from several sources indicating diagnosis and treatment of the same
or related disability prior to February 1985. Additionally, the "hearing officer may have decided
that Nunez' version of the date [of the injury] was guided ... by statute of limitations considerations."
Id. at 190, 769 P.2d at 103.
135. Id. Other doctors described the disability as a chronic condition, possibly of arthritic origin.
Id.
136. See Tallman, 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363.
137. See Nunez, 108 N.M. 186, 769 P.2d 99.
138. Id.
139. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-10(A) (Cum. Supp. 1989) states:
In case an injury to, or death of, a worker results from his failure to observe
statutory regulations appertaining to the safe conduct of his employment or from
his failure to use a safety device provided by his employer, then the compensation
otherwise payable under the Worker's Compensation Act . . . shall be reduced ten
percent.
140. E.g., Dickerson v. Farmers' Elec. Coop., 67 N.M. 23, 350 P.2d 1037 (1960). Farmers'
Electric introduced uncontroverted evidence that rubber insulated gloves designed to withstand 15,000
volts of electricity for three minutes were generally used in the electrical industry. Id. at 25-26, 350
P.2d at 1039-40. However, the particular gloves supplied to the plaintiff had not been tested within
208 days of the accident, when they should have been tested within 90 days of the accident. Also,
one of the gloves failed that test. Id. Therefore, the defendant's claim to reduce the award for
failure to use safety devices failed. The question of general use within an industry must be resolved
against the employer. Id. at 26, 350 P.2d at 1040.
141. Montoya v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 61 N.M. 268, 299 P.2d 84 (1956). Montoya argued
that a work practice is a safety device. Thus, the defendant's failure to store detonators and explosives
in separate areas represented a failure to provide the plaintiff a safety device provided by law. Id.
at 270, 299 P.2d at 86. The plaintiff would have been entitled to an additional 50%0 compensation
had that argument succeeded. Id. at 271, 299 P.2d at 87. The argument failed, however, on the
ground that a "reasonably safe place of employment" is not tangible and is therefore not a "safety
device." Id. at 273, 299 P.2d at 89.
142. 107 N.M. 788, 765 P.2d 761 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 785, 765 P.2d 758 (1988).
143. Id. at 790, 765 P.2d at 763.
144. Id. at 794, 765 P.2d at 767.
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issue of safety devices in the pleadings but testified about them at
trial. 45 Cisneros did not object to the testimony and cross-examined
the witness on the matter of hearing protectors. 146 Therefore, the court
of appeals held that the issue was tried by consent and a ten percent
reduction of the
worker's benefits was proper despite its absence from
47
the pleadings.

F.

Disability
The Interim Workers' Compensation Act changed New Mexico's definition of disability. 48 The definition then returned to its original form
after the Interim Act expired. 149 Under the 1965 amendment to the 1959
Workers' Compensation Act, a totally disabled worker was wholly unable
to perform the usual tasks of his work and wholly unable to perform
any work for which he was fitted. 5 0 A partially disabled worker, under
the 1965 amendment, was a worker unable to a "percentage-extent"
to perform his usual work or other work for which he was fitted."'
To determine what work a worker was fit for, the court looked at age,
education, training,2 general physical and mental capacity, and previous
work experience. 1
The Interim Act complicated the picture by defining three
categories of disability: permanent total disability, 5 ' partial

145. Id. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-10(E) (Repl. Pamp. 1987) places the burden on the employer
to allege the specific safety device it claims an employee failed to use before the employer may
claim a reduction in compensation. The plaintiff claimed that the statute requires an employer to
raise the safety device defense in its pleadings. Cisneros, 107 N.M. at 794, 765 P.2d at 767.
146. Cisneros, 107 N.M. at 794, 765 P.2d at 767.
147. Id. (distinguishing Salazar v. City of Santa Fe, 102 N.M. 172, 692 P.2d 1321 (Ct. App.
1983) and applying Sup. CT. RuLts ANN. 1-015(B) (Recomp. 1986) (pleadings to be amended to
conform to evidence regarding issues not raised)).
148. Act approved Feb. 21, 1986, ch. 22, 1986 N.M. Laws 525.
149. The Act approved Apr. 9, 1987, ch. 235, §§ 10-12, 1987 N.M. Laws 1261, 1267-68, repealed
the sections under the Interim Act relating to permanent total disability, partial disability, and
temporary total disability and amended the Act with sections on the definition of impairment, total
disability, and partial disability. These amendments are codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-24
to -26 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
150. As used in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 'total disability' means a condition
whereby a workman, by reason of an injury arising out of, and in the course of,
his employment, is wholly unable to perform the usual tasks in the work he was
performing at the time of his injury, and is wholly unable to perform any work
for which he is fitted by age, education, training, general physical and mental
capacity, and previous work experience.
Act approved Apr. 2, 1965, ch. 295, § 18, 1965 N.M. Laws 945-55 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-10-12.18 (1953)).
151. As used in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 'partial disability' means a condition
whereby a workman, by reason of injury arising out of and in the course of his
employment, is unable to some percentage-extent to perform the usual tasks in the
work he was performing at the time of his injury and is unable to some percentageextent to perform any work for which he is fitted by age, education, training,
general physical and mental capacity and previous work experience.
Id. § 19 at 955 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-12.19 (1953)).
152. Id.
153. Act approved Feb. 21, 1986, ch. 22, § 4, 1986 N.M. Laws 525, 529 (effective dates July
1, 1986 and Dec. 1, 1986) (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-24 (Repl. Pamp. 1989)) defined
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disability,5 4 and temporary total disability.' 55 All three definitions required the factfinder to determine the worker's "date of maximum
medical improvement,' ' 5 6 a concept which did not survive the 1987
Act. Thus, the more complicated scheme of disability was short-lived;
the 1987 Act returned to the traditional definitions.
The 1987 Act, in effect since June 19, 1987, eliminated the concept
of temporary total disability and reinstated, with several modifications,
the original definitions of total and partial disability. Two major
modifications were enacted. First, loss or permanent loss of the use
of both hands, both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or loss of
15 7
any of two of the foregoing body parts constitutes total disability.
Second, a Workers' Compensation hearing officer now has the power
to determine the percentage of a worker's disability by considering
the work the worker can perform or could perform if vocational
rehabilitation is required. 5 '
The body of New Mexico law interpreting the 1965 statutory amendment developed a two-question test for determining total disability. 5 9
First, is the worker totally unable to perform the work he was performing at the time of the injury? Second, is the worker totally unable
to perform work for which he is fitted by age, training, or experience?

"Permanent Total Disability" as:
[A] permanent physical impairment to a workman resulting by reason of an accidental
injury arising out of and in the course of employment whereby a workman is
wholly unable to earn comparable wages or salary. In determining whether a workman
is able to earn comparable wages and salary, the hearing officer shall consider the
benefits the worker is entitled to receive under Section 52-1-43 NMSA 1978. If the
benefits to which the workman is entitled under Section 52-1-43 NMSA 1978 and
the wage he is able to earn after the date of maximum medical improvement and
vocational rehabilitation as provided in this act is comparable to the wage the
worker was earning when he was injured, he shall be deemed to be able to earn
comparable wages or salary. 'Physical impairment' does not include impairment of
function due solely to psychological or emotional conditions, including mental stress.
154. Act approved Feb. 21, 1986, ch. 22, § 5, 1986 N.M. Laws 525, 529-30 (effective dates July
1, 1986 and Dec. 1, 1986) (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-26 (Cum. Supp. 1989)) defined
"Partial Disability" as:
[A] permanent physical impairment to a workman resulting from an accidental
injury arising out of and in the course of employment, whereby a workman has
any anatomic or functional abnormality existing after the date of maximum medical
improvement as determined by a medically or scientifically demonstrable finding as
presented in the American Medical Association's guide to the evaluation of permanent
impairment, copyrighted 1984, 1977 or 1971, or comparable publications by the
American Medical Association.
155. Act of Feb. 21, 1986, ch. 22, § 6, 1986 N.M. Laws 525, 530 (effective dates July 1, 1986
and Dec. 1, 1986) (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-26 (Cum. Supp. 1989)) defined "Temporary
Total Disability" as "the inability of the workman, by reason of accidental injury arising out of
and in the course of his employment, to perform his duties prior to the date of his maximum
medical improvement."
156. See supra notes 153-55 and infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
157. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-25(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
158. Id. § 52-1-26.
159. See, e.g., Dodrill v. Albuquerque Utilities Corp., 103 N.M. 737, 713 P.2d 7 (Ct. App.
1985); Sanchez v. Homestake Mining Co., 102 N.M. 473, 697 P.2d 156 (Ct. App. 1985); Medina
v. Wicked Wick Candle Co., 91 N.M. 522, 577 P.2d 420 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 249,
572 P.2d 1257 (1977).
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Similarly, cases interpreting the 1965 amendment developed a twoquestion test for determining partial disability.1 60 First, is the worker
totally or partially unable to perform the work he was performing at
the time of the injury? Second, is the worker totally or partially unable
to perform work for which he is fitted by age, training, or experience?
Five cases during the survey period addressed the various definitions
of disability.' 6' Two of those five cases demonstrate the shifting burden
of proof requirements under the Interim Act and the present law.
Hensler v. Clarke Oil Well Service 62 was decided under the 1965
amendment to the 1959 Workers' Compensation Act. Hensler appealed
a hearing officer's finding, later upheld by the court of appeals, that
he was ten percent disabled.' 63 The supreme court remanded the case
to the hearing officer to determine Hensler's capacity to work.' 64 In
doing so, the supreme court reiterated the doctrine that a worker bears
the burden of establishing the disability and his age, education, training,
and physical and mental capacity.' 65 The burden then shifts to the
employer to prove that the worker is not totally disabled by proving
that the worker is employable to do some work for which he is
qualified. 166 Even if the hearing officer finds the worker able to perform
available work, that available work
must satisfy any restrictions the
167
worker's physician places on him.

In Baca v. Bueno Foods,'6 decided under the Interim Act, the court
addressed the question of the worker's date of maximum medical

160. E.g., Smith v. City of Albuquerque, 105 N.M. 125, 131, 729 P.2d 1379, 1385 (Ct. App.
1986).
161. Hensler v. Clarke Oil Well Serv., 108 N.M. 51, 766 P.2d 311 (1988); Baca v. Bueno Foods,
108 N.M. 98, 766 P.2d 1332 (Ct. App. 1988); Urioste v. Sideris, 107 N.M. 733, 764 P.2d 504 (Ct.
App. 1988); Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight), 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 109 N.M. 33, 781 P.2d 305 (1988); Harrison v. Animas Valley Auto & Truck Repair,
107 N.M. 373, 758 P.2d 787 (1988).
In Urioste, decided under the Interim Act, the court held that post-injury employment does not
necessarily preclude a finding of total temporary disability. Rather, the facts of each particular case
determine whether post-injury employment evidences the worker's ability to perform. Urioste, 107
N.M. at 737-38, 764 P.2d at 508-09.
In Tallman, decided under the Interim Act, the court stated that even if the accidental injury
results in only five percent impairment of the worker's ability, the injury may still be termed
"temporary total disability" if the worker can establish his inability to perform his duties prior to
the date of maximum medical improvement. Tallman, 108 N.M. at 132, 767 P.2d at 371.
In Harrison, decided under the 1959 Act, the Supreme Court of New Mexico upheld a trial court
determination that a worker who is unable to perform 800 of the work for which he is fit is 80%
disabled and thus entitled to 600 weeks of benefits. Harrison, 107 N.M. at 374-75, 758 P.2d at
788-89.
162. 108 N.M. 51, 766 P.2d 311.
163. Id. at 52, 766 P.2d at 312. Hensler injured his back while descending from an oil derrick.
Id. at 53, 766 P.2d at 313.
164. Id. at 52, 766 P.2d at 312.
165. Id. (citing Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 82 N.M. 424, 427, 483 P.2d 305, 308 (Ct. App.
1970)).
166. Id. If the worker. cannot do the work he was doing before the injury and is unable to do
work he is qualified to do, he is totally disabled. Id. at 51, 766 P.2d at 312 (citing Quintana v.
Trotz Const. Co., 79 N.M. 109, 112, 440 P.2d 301, 304 (1968)).
167. Id. at 52, 766 P.2d at 313.
168. 108 N.M. 98, 766 P.2d 1332 (Ct. App. 1988).
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improvement. Baca injured her finger and back while working for
Bueno Foods, and after the accident she was unable to perform her
job duties. 69 A hearing officer granted Baca temporary total disability
benefits because her injury had not yet reached maximum medical
improvement. 70 The court of appeals reversed, finding that the worker
had the burden of proving she had not reached the date of maximum
7
medical improvement and had failed to meet her burden. '
While the holdings in Hensler and Baca appear contradictory with
regard to burden of proof, their difference can be attributed to the
fact that they were decided under the auspices of different statutory
schemes. With the elimination of the "maximum medical improvement"
language in the current Act and the return to definitions of disability
7 2
similar to those before the Interim Act, Hensler and its predecessors
should remain in force.
G.

Notice
The Worker's Compensation Act requires a worker to give written
notice of his injury within thirty days or within sixty days if prevented
from doing so by reason of the injury itself or some other cause
beyond his control. 73 However, no notice is required if the employer
has actual knowledge of the injury. 74 Predictably, the question of
whether an employer had actual knowledge of an injury has been the
75
subject of much litigation.
Cases prior to the survey period held that a determination of actual
knowledge must be based on the totality of facts and circumstances
surrounding the injury.' 76 While a verbal report of the injury may
1 71
suffice, casual conversation does not meet the notice requirement.
The cases decided during the survey period addressing the notice
issue failed to clearly define "actual knowledge" but did grant a liberal
amount of discretion to the judge or hearing officer to determine
whether an employer had actual knowledge of an injury. Urioste v.

169.
170.
171.
172.
Brown
173.

Id. at 99, 766 P.2d at 1333.
Id.
Id. at 103, 706 P.2d at 1337.
E.g., Sanchez v. Homestake Mining Co., 102 N.M. 473, 697 P.2d 156 (Ct. App. 1985);
v. Safeway Stores, 82 N.M. 424, 483 P.2d 305 (Ct. App. 1970).
N.M. STAT. AN. § 52-1-29(A) (Cum. Supp. 1989) states:
Any worker claiming to be entitled to compensation from any employer shall give
notice in writing to his employer of the accident and of the injury within thirty
days after their occurrence unless by reason of his injury or some other cause
beyond his control the worker is prevented from giving notice within that time, in
which case he shall give notice as soon as may reasonably be done and at all events
not later than sixty days after the occurrence of the accident.
174. Id. § 52-1-29(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1987). For a discussion of the actual knowledge doctrine as
it relates to the Subsequent Injury Act, see infra notes 393-96 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Powers v. Riccobene Masonry Constr., Inc., 97 N.M. 20, 636 P.2d 291 (Ct. App.
1980).
176. See id.; Rohrer v. Eidal Int'l, 79 N.M. 711, 449 P.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1968).
177. Loranzo v. Archer, 71 N.M. 175, 376 P.2d 963 (1962); Marez v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp.,
93 N.M. 9, 595 P.2d 1204 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 532, 591 P.2d 286 (1979).
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Sideris178 involved a worker who injured his back while moving a
bathtub at a construction site. 179 Urioste presented corroborated evidence that he told Sideris, his employer, of the injury and how it
happened and gave Sideris a doctor's note excusing him from work. 18 0
Sideris acknowledged that he knew Urioste injured his back, but he
maintained he did not know the circumstances surrounding the injury.",'
The court of appeals, under the "totality of the facts and circumstances" rule, upheld the hearing officer's182determination that Sideris
had actual knowledge of Urioste's injury.
In Nunez v. Smith's Management Corp.,'83 the court again examined
the issue of sufficiency of verbal notice. Nunez claimed that he fell
off a stack of pallets while working and struck his right shoulder on
a knife sharpener. 18 4 He offered uncontroverted testimony that he
informed his employer about the accident. 8 ' Nunez contended that he
told his supervisor about his injury "like the next day."'1 86 That testimony was discredited by the impeachment of other testimony about
the circumstances of the accident. 18 7 Therefore, the court did not require
the hearing officer to adopt Nunez' testimony on notice. 88 Nunez did
not satisfy his burden of proving compliance with the statutory notice
requirement. 8 9
H.

Scheduled Injuries
The Workers' Compensation Act prescribes the number of weeks of
compensation allowable for the loss or loss of the use of specific
bodily members. 90 The worker is then entitled to at least $36.00 per
week but not more than eighty-five percent of the state's average

178. 107 N.M. 733, 764 P.2d 504 (Ct. App. 1988).
179. Id. at 735, 764 P.2d at 506. See infra notes 393-96 and accompanying text.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 736, 764 P.2d at 507. While the testimony conflicted, substantial evidence in the
whole record supported the hearing officer's finding. Id. For a discussion of the standard of review,
see infra notes 349-54 and accompanying text.
183. 108 N.M. 186, 769 P.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1988).
184. Id.at 187, 769 P.2d at 100.
185. Id. at 191, 769 P.2d at 104.
186. Id.
187. Id. Although Nunez claimed hisinjury occurred in February 1985, there was evidence placing
the date of the accident as early as August 1979. Id. at 190, 769 P.2d at 103.
188. Id. at 191, 709 P.2d at 104.
189. Id.
190. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-43(A) (Cum. Supp. 1989) provides: "For disability resulting from
an accidental injury to specific body members, including the loss or loss of use thereof, the worker
shall receive the weekly maximum and minimum compensation for disability as provided in Section
52-1-41 NMSA 1978, for [certain listed] periods[.J" For example, loss of one arm at or near the
shoulder entitles the worker to 200 weeks of compensation benefits. Id. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-143(B) (Cum. Supp. 1989) provides:
For a partial loss of use of one of the body members or physical functions listed
in Subsection A of thissection, the worker shall receive compensation computed
on the basis of the degree of such partial loss of use, payable for the number of
weeks applicable to total loss or loss of use of that body member or physical
function.
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weekly wage for the specified number of weeks.' 9' If a worker is
partially disabled and his disability is limited to bodily members specified in the scheduled injuries statute, his compensation is determined
by the statute.

92

Otherwise, the workers' compensation officer deter-

mines the extent of the worker's disability. 93
Three cases during the survey period examined whether the scheduled
injuries statute applied to the claimants in question. 94 Nelson v. Nelson
Chemical Corp. 95 involved the president and director of a chemical
corporation who twice fell from a truck and injured his back and
hip. 96 The trial court held that Nelson suffered a fifty percent impairment to his leg at the hip and awarded compensation under the

scheduled injuries statute. 97 The court of appeals reversed the award
of scheduled injury benefits and remanded the case to the district
court to determine the amount of partial disability benefits due the
plaintiff. 98
The court of appeals outlined the appropriate test for determining

whether the scheduled injury provision covers a particular injury. 99
First, the court or hearing officer must determine if the injury is
covered by the scheduled injuries provision. 200 Only if the answer to
that threshold question is "yes" does the factfinder proceed to determine whether the impairment resulting from that injury extends to
other parts of the body or otherwise renders the claimant totally
disabled. 20 1 If the injury is not specifically provided for in the schedule,

then compensation for partial disability may be awarded under section
52-1-42.202

The court determined that Nelson's injury was not covered by the
scheduled injury provision. 20 3 Nelson's injury was to the hip itself as
opposed to a leg "at or near the hip joint.120 4 An injury to the hip

191. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-41 (Cum. Supp. 1989). The Employment Security Division of the
Labor Department determines the average weekly wage in the state each year. Id.
192. Id. § 52-1-43(B) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
193. See id. §§ 52-1-26, -42 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
194. Harrison v. Animas Valley Auto and Truck Repair, 107 N.M. 373, 758 P.2d 787 (1988);
Beltran v. Van Ark Care Center, 107 N.M. 273, 756 P.2d I (Ct. App. 1988); Nelson v. Nelson
Chemical Corp., 105 N.M. 493, 734 P.2d 273 (Ct. App. 1987).
195. 105 N.M. 493, 734 P.2d 273 (Ct. App. 1987).
196. Id. at 494-95, 734 P.2d at 274-75.
197. Id. at 495, 734 P.2d at 275.
198. Id. at 497, 734 P.2d at 277. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of benefits
for the aggravation of Nelson's preexisting back injury, finding sufficient evidence to support a
finding of no causal connection. Id.
199. Id. at 496, 734 P.2d at 276 (citing Hise Constr. v. Candelaria, 98 N.M. 759, 652 P.2d 1210
(1982)).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-142 (Cum. Supp. 1989) provides in part: "For partial disability,
the workers' compensation benefits not specifically provided for in section 52-1-43 NMSA 1978 shall
be a percentage of the benefit payable for total disability."
203. Id.
204. Id. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-43(A) (Cum. Supp. 1989) allows a claimant 200 weeks of
compensation for injury to one leg at or near the hip joint so as to preclude the use of an artificial
limb.
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itself is an injury to the body as a whole, even when it results in pain
or impairment of one of the specified bodily members, in this case,
a leg. 20 5 The court of appeals did not address the question of whether
Nelson's impairment due to the hip injury extended to other parts of
his body or otherwise totally disabled him.20 6 The court remanded with
instructions to determine the percentage of partial disability suffered
20 7
by Nelson.
In Harrison v. Animas Valley Auto and Truck Repair,20 8 the supreme
court considered whether the worker was entitled to either total or
partial disability instead of the scheduled injury compensation. 20 9 The
court's analysis, similar to the second prong in Nelson, considered
whether the injury extends to other parts of the body. 210 Unlike the
second prong in Nelson, the court expressly considered whether the
21
disability or impairment was partial as well as total. 1
The court adopted the two-part test from Aragon v. Mountain States
Construction Co. 21 2 for deciding whether a worker is entitled to either
partial or total disability instead of the scheduled injury benefit. 213 In
Aragon, the court first considered whether the loss of a specific body
member "caused a separate and distinct 'disability' or 'impairment'
to other parts of the body. 21 4 The court then inquired whether the
worker was partially or totally disabled because he or she could not
wholly or partially do the prior work or other suitable work.2 1 1
In his concurring opinion in Harrison, Justice Ransom stated the
general rule that a worker who suffers an injury listed in the Act's
schedule is limited to recovery under the schedule unless the injury
renders the worker totally disabled. 21 6 The scheduled injury provisions
are not exclusive, however, if there is additionally "separate and distinct
impairment to other parts of the body" resulting in partial disability. 21 7
In Harrison, the trial court found injuries to the worker's right arm,
right wrist, and right hand.2"' The supreme court affirmed the trial
court's partial disability award, explicitly finding that the injuries
extended to the "whole man. ' 21 9 Justice Ransom considered the finding
of "incapacitating pain" persuasive as a separate and distinct im-

205. Nelson, 105 N.M. at 496, 734 P.2d at 276.
206. Id. at 497, 734 P.2d at 277.
207. Id.
208. 107 N.M. 373, 758 P.2d 787 (1988).
209. Id. at 374, 758 P.2d at 788.
210. Id. See supra text accompanying note 201.
211. Harrison, 107 N.M. at 374, 758 P.2d at 788.
212. 98 N.M. 225, 230, 647 P.2d 427, 432 (Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 98 N.M. 194,
647 P.2d 396 (1982).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 107 N.M. at 375, 758 P.2d at 789 (citing Hise Constr. v. Candelaria, 98 N.M. 759, 652
P.2d 1210 (1982)).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 373, 758 P.2d at 787.
219. Id. at 374-75, 758 P.2d at 788-89.
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pairment allowing compensation under partial disability instead of the

schedule .220

In Beltran v. Van Ark Care Center,22 1 the court combined unrelated
injuries to the worker's knee and shoulder and awarded partial disability
compensation.22 2 The injuries, separated by fourteen months, occurred
at the same place of employment but were covered by different compensation insurers. 2 3 The insurer covering the first injury to the knee
argued that compensation must be limited to the scheduled injury
224
provision covering loss or loss of use of specific body members.
The court of appeals remanded for the worker to establish separate
and distinct impairment to a body part other
than the knee in order
225
to obtain partial disability compensation.
Lump Sum Payments
The Act permits lump sum payments, in lieu of periodic payments,
only when the parties agree to lump sum payments or "lump sum
L

payments are clearly in the best interests of the parties. ' 226 For a
hearing officer to approve a commutation from periodic payment to
lump sum payment, the hearing officer must find the agreement to

be fair, equitable, and consistent with the 227
provisions of the Act or

the Occupational Disease Disablement Law.
In Raines v. W.A. Klinger & Sons, 221 the court addressed whether
a worker who was receiving maximum compensation benefits could
petition for lump sum payment. The court specifically overruled previous cases precluding petitions for lump sum payments when the

worker was receiving maximum benefits. 229 The supreme court stated
that a petition for lump sum payment is not a separate claim, but is
a request for modification of the method of payment. 2 0 Thus, the

220. Id. at 375, 758 P.2d at 789.
221. 107 N.M. 273, 756 P.2d I (Ct. App. 1988).
222. Id. at 274, 756 P.2d at 2.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 275, 756 P.2d at 3.
225. Id.
226. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-12(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1987). The courts have adopted a stringent
two-prong test for determining whether a lump sum award will be in the party's best interest. The
petitioner must prove that the lump sum commutation is in his best interest and denial of lump
sum would create "manifest hardship." E.g., Codling v. Aztec Well Servicing, 89 N.M. 213, 216,
549 P.2d 628, 631 (Ct. App. 1976).
227. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-14 (Repl. Pamp. 1987). The Occupational Disease Disablement Law
is discussed infra at notes 421-55 and accompanying text.
228. 107 N.M. 668, 763 P.2d 684 (1988).
229. Id. at 669, 763 P.2d at 685. Raines expressly overruled Neuman v. A.S. Horner, Inc., 99
N.M. 603, 661 P.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1983), Minnerup v. Stewart Bros. Drilling, 93 N.M. 561, 603
P.2d 300 (Ct. App. 1979), and Armijo v. Co-Con Constr., 92 N.M. 295, 587 P.2d 442 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 92 N.M. 260, 586 P.2d 1089 (1978).
230. Raines, 107 N.M. at 670, 763 P.2d at 686. Raines was decided under the Act prior to the
1986 revision and reenactment. Id.at 668, 763 P.2d at 684 n.l.
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court held that section 52-1-69,23l prohibiting claims brought by workers
who are receiving maximum benefits, does not preclude petitions for
23 2
lump sum payment.
In Rojo v. Loeper Landscaping,233 the supreme court considered
whether a hearing officer improperly disapproved payment of a lump

sum after one of the parties attempted to repudiate an agreement that
had been fairly negotiated, signed, and filed. 234 In Rojo, a worker
who was receiving periodic compensation payments agreed to a lump
sum settlement with the employer's insurer. 235 The worker signed the
agreement and was murdered the next day. 2 6 Before the insurance
company knew of the worker's death, the insurer also signed the
agreement. 23 7 The worker's attorney, who did not yet know of the
murder, filed the agreement the same day. 238 When the insurance
company found out about the worker's death, it decided to repudiate
the agreement. 23 9
The court held that the hearing officer's finding that the settlement
would provide for substantial justice left the hearing officer without
grounds to deny approval of the settlement agreement. 240 Further, the

death of a party after an agreement is made is not a ground for

disapproving payment of the settlement. 24' Thus, the court read section
52-5-14(A) as allowing a hearing officer to disapprove a lump sum
settlement agreement only when there is a finding that the settlement
would not provide for substantial justice. 242 The court also reasoned
that the insurance company gambled that the lump sum would be less
than the total amount of periodic payments, thus taking the risk that

231. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-69 (1953) (repealed 1986) provided:
No claim shall be filed by any workman who is receiving maximum compensation
benefits; provided, however, a workman claiming additional compensation benefits,
because of his employer's alleged failure to provide a safety device, may file suit
therefor, but in such event only the safety device issue may be determined therein.
The current provision, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-18 (Cum. Supp. 1989), provides:
No additional claim shall be filed by any worker who is receiving maximum
compensation except that a worker claiming additional compensation because of
his employer's alleged failure to provide a safety device may file claim for that
compensation, but in that event, only the safety devices issue may be determined
in the claim.
232. Raines, 107 N.M. at 669, 763 P.2d at 685. In a previous case, Zamora v. CPK Contracting
Company, 106 N.M. 309, 742 P.2d 521 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 106 N.M. 353, 742 P.2d 1058
(1987), the court of appeals held that section 52-1-69 did not bar petitions for lump sum payment
by dependents of a deceased worker.
233. 107 N.M. 407, 759 P.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1988).
234. Id. at 409, 759 P.2d at 196.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 410, 759 P.2d at 197. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-14(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1987) allows a
hearing officer to disapprove an agreement for lump sum payment when the hearing officer determines
that the agreement will not provide substantial justice.
241. Rojo, 107 N.M. at 410, 759 P.2d at 197.
242. See supra note 240.
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death will not occur. 24a Rojo makes clear that appellate courts will
require hearing officers to strictly abide by section 52-1-14(A) when
they approve or deny lump sum agreements.
J.

Time Limitations
A claim for workers' compensation benefits must be filed within a
maximum of two years and thirty-one days 244 from the date of an
accidental work-related disability if the worker remains employed by
the employer from the time of the injury. 245 The maximum period is
computed from an aggregation of statutory limits.

246

The employer has

247
thirty-one days after the date of disability to pay the first installment.
If the employer refuses or fails to pay, the claimant has one year to
file a claim from the date of refusal or failure to pay. 241 In addition,
if the worker remains employed with his employer, the statute of
limitations is tolled for a maximum of one year. 249 The statute of
limitations does not apply to claims for medical expenses 250 nor to

vocational rehabilitation expenses .251

During the survey period, the courts addressed issues concerning
when the statute of limitations for claiming workers' compensation
benefits begins to run and when it is tolled. 2 2 Also, the legislature
enacted a specific statute of limitations
for claims against the Sub253
sequent Injury Fund (the Fund).

In Salazar v. Albuquerque Tribune,25 4 the court of appeals addressed
the issue of when the statute of limitations commences if the disability
arises sometime after the injury. Salazar fell and injured his left foot

243. Rojo, 107 N.M. at 410, 759 P.2d at 197.
244. The time periods of sections 52-1-30 and -31(A) are added together to compute the maximum
period in which a compensation claim may be brought. Section 52-1-30 states that the first installment
payment of benefits shall be paid no later than 31 days after the date of disability. Section 52-131(A) requires a claimant to file within one year after the failure or refusal of an employer or its
carrier to pay compensation. Section 52-1-31(A) has a tolling provision for one year when the
worker remains employed with that same employer. See ABF Freight System v. Montano, 99 N.M.
259, 657 P.2d 115 (1982); Cole v. J.A. Drake Well Serv., 106 N.M. 484, 745 P.2d 392 (Ct. App.
1987). Section 52-1-31 makes clear that the notice provisions of section 52-1-29, requiring the worker
claiming entitlement to compensation to provide written notice to the employer of the accident and
injury, must be complied with. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-29, -30, -31(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
245. Salazar v. Albuquerque Tribune, 107 N.M. 674, 763 P.2d 690 (Ct. App. 1988); Cole v.
J.A. Drake Well Serv., 106 N.M. 484, 745 P.2d 392.
246. See supra note 244.
247. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-30 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
248. Id. § 52-1-31(A).
249. Id.
250. Nasci v. Frank Paxton Lumber Co., 69 N.M. 412, 367 P.2d 913 (1961); Salazar v. Albuquerque
Tribune, 107 N.M. 674, 763 P.2d 690 (Ct. App. 1988); Hutcherson v. Dawn Trucking Co., 107
N.M. 358, 758 P.2d 308 (Ct. App. 1988).
251. Maitlen v. Getty Oil Co., 105 N.M. 370, 733 P.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1987).
252. Salazar v. Albuquerque Tribune, 107 N.M. 674, 763 P.2d 690; Hutcherson v. Dawn Trucking
Co., 107 N.M. 358, 758 P.2d 308.
253. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-14 (Cum. Supp. 1989). This development is discussed in the
Subsequent Injury Act section of the survey, infra notes 388-92 and accompanying text.
254. 107 N.M. 674, 763 P.2d 690.
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on August 25, 1984.215 The fall aggravated a preexisting, non-work
related infection and led to the immediate amputation of a toe and,
on April 15, 1985, of the leg. 25 6 The Worker filed his claim on April
10, 1987.257 The court concluded that when the disability happens some
time after the injury, the statute of limitations runs from the date of
disability, Salazar's leg amputation,
and not from the date of the
2
worker's awareness of his injury.

1

To answer the question of when the statute of limitations began to
run, the court applied the two-prong test articulated in Noland v.
Young Drilling Co. 25 9 The court must determine when a worker was
or should have been aware he suffered a compensable injury and when
the employer failed or refused to pay compensation. 260 To answer both
prongs, the court considered when the disability occurred. First, under
a modification of the initial prong, where the disability occurs after
the worker is aware of a compensable injury, the limitation period
begins to run after the occurrence of the disability.2 61 Second, the next
262
prong of the test cannot be met until a disability occurs.
In Salazar, the worker and the insurer's claims adjuster believed at
the time of the initial injury that the worker was only entitled to
medical benefits. 2 3 The court of appeals found that the hearing officer's
implicit finding that there was no partial disability before April 1985
was supported by substantial evidence. 264 Thus, the worker's only valid
claim was for the loss of his leg on April 15, 1985, under the scheduled
injury provision. 265 Therefore, his claim was timely filed on April 15,
266
1987, two years later.

In Hutcherson v. Dawn Trucking Co.,267 the issue concerned the
tolling of the statute of limitations by the "course of conduct" of
the employer or insurer. The hearing officer granted summary judgment
to the employer and its insurer based on a determination that the

255. Id. at 676, 763 P.2d at 692.
256. Id. at 675, 763 P.2d at 691.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 676, 763 P.2d at 692.
259. 79 N.M. 444, 444 P.2d 771 (Ct. App. 1968).
260. Salazar, 107 N.M. at 676, 763 P.2d at 692.
261. Id. In Noland, the court of appeals stated that a worker should not lose a benefit for failing
to file "a claim for a non-compensable injury which he has no reason to believe will result in a
serious and compensable injury." 79 N.M. at 446-47, 444 P.2d at 773-74. The court rejected,
however, any tolling once a compensable injury is discernable until a more serious disability is
ascertainable. Id. at 447, 444 P.2d at 774. In Noland, the worker lost circulation in a finger due
to a December, 1964 wrist injury. Id. at 448, 444 P.2d at 775. The finger was amputated in 1966.
Id. The court found that Noland knew the seriousness of the injury as early as March, 1965, and
that he was entitled to compensation for a period beginning June, 1965. Id. at 446, 444 P.2d at
773. The court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, filed February 8, 1967, as untimely. Id.
at 447, 444 P.2d at 774.
262. Salazar, 107 N.M. at 677, 763 P.2d at 693.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 678, 763 P.2d at 694.
266. Id.
267. 107 N.M. 358, 758 P.2d 308 (Ct. App. 1988).
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statute of limitations barred the claim. 268 The worker argued that the
insurer's conduct tolled the period of limitations under section 52-136 of the Act. 269 To successfully rebut the movant's prima facie case
for summary judgment, the worker was required to establish "reasonable doubt that a material issue of fact existed ' 270 as to each
272
element 21 of his claim that the statute of limitations was tolled.
In Hutcherson, the court of appeals held that the worker sufficiently
satisfied his burden of establishing reasonable doubt. 273 The court ruled
that a determination of whether a claimant relied on the employer's
or insurer's course of conduct is not limited to communications with
the claimant. 274 The claimant may prove the elements of the course
of conduct by inference. 275 Thus, in evaluating the course of conduct
the factfinder may consider an internal insurance memorandum indicating the insurance company's anticipation of settlement. 276 The
court also considered that the claimant was not familiar with workers'
compensation law, that the claimant was not represented by an attorney
until just prior to his claim, and that the claimant relied on an insurance
adjuster who was a law school graduate with experience in workers'
The court remanded for a trial on the merits
compensation claims. 27 7 27
of the limitations issue. 1
During the survey period the legislature revised section 52-1-58 to
an extent that commentary is necessary on the current requirements
for filing accident reports to the workers' compensation director. Currently, section 52-1-58279 requires an employer to file an accident report
for accidental injuries resulting in the loss of more than seven days
of work. 28 0 The amendment tolls the period of limitations only when

268. Id. at 359, 758 P.2d at 309.
269. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-36 (Cum. Supp. 1989) provides:
The failure of any person entitled to compensation under the Workers' Compensation
Act to give any notice or file any claim within the time fixed by the Workers'
Compensation Act shall not deprive such person of the right to compensation where
the failure was caused in whole or in part by the conduct of the employer or
insurer which reasonably led the person entitled to compensation to believe the
compensation would be paid.
270. Hutcherson, 107 N.M. at 360, 758 P.2d at 310 (citing Koenig v. Perez, 104 N.M. 664, 726
P.2d 341 (1986)).
271. To toll the statute of limitations under section 52-1-36 the claimant must prove he reasonably
believed that compensation would be paid, and his belief was based, in whole or in part, on the
employer's or insurer's conduct. Hutcherson, 107 N.M. at 360, 758 P.2d at 310.
272. Id. at 360, 758 P.2d at 310.
273. Id.at 361, 758 P.2d at 311.
274. Id. at 360, 758 P.2d at 310.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.at 361, 758 P.2d at 311.
278. Id. at 362, 758 P.2d at 312.

279. N.M.

STAT.

ANN.

§ 52-1-58 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).

280. In one case during the survey period, Cisneros v. Molycorp, 107 N.M. 788, 765 P.2d 761
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 785, 765 P.2d 758 (1988), the court held that the statute of
limitations for filing a claim for compensation benefits was tolled when the employer failed to file
an accident report. Id. at 793, 765 P.2d at 766. Prior to the 1987 amendment, the statute required
an employer to file an accident report for any accidental injuries which occurred to any employee
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the worker has lost more than seven days of work and the employer
has not filed an accident report. 21' Previously, section 52-1-58 tolled
the period of limitations when the employer did not file an
accident
282
report regardless of whether the worker missed any work.
K.

Medical Expenses
Section 52-1-49 of the Workers' Compensation Act requires an employer to provide appropriate, reasonably necessary, and adequate
treatment in a timely manner. 283 A claimant seeking reimbursement of
past medical expenses must prove the expenses were reasonably necessary, the fees were reasonable charges, and the expenses were directly
related to the worker's disability. 2

4

During the survey period, the

courts addressed whether workers who obtained medical services other
285
than those offered by the employer were entitled to reimbursement,
whether claimants offered sufficient proof of medical expenses, 28 6 and
28 7
the scope of reasonable, necessary, and timely medical services.
In Eldridge v. Aztec Well Servicing Co. ,288 the court of appeals
considered whether an employer provided appropriate, reasonable, and
adequate medical services with sufficient promptness, or whether the
employer should reimburse the worker for unauthorized medical treatment. 28 9 In Eldridge, the worker was hit in the back while working
on a drilling rig. The next day, he performed his usual duties until
he strained his back picking up a water cooler. 290 This second incident
was not reported to the employer until the third day, and the worker
did not directly complain of the injury to anyone, nor did he request
emergency treatment, though it was readily apparent to the worker
that he "could

not move around." ' 29' The court stated that when

considering whether medical services were timely depends on the nature
of the injury and the circumstances of both the accident and the

during the course of their employment. Because Cisneros concerned a complaint filed before the
effective date of the 1987 amendment, the statute of limitations was tolled. Id.; see also N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 52-1-58 (Cum. Supp. 1986) (amended 1987).
281. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-58 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
282. Id. § 52-1-58 (Cum. Supp. 1986) (amended 1987).
283. Eldridge v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 105 N.M. 660, 663, 735 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 105 N.M. 644, 735 P.2d 1150 (1987).
284. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-49 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
285. Baca v. Bueno Foods, 108 N.M. 98, 766 P.2d 1332 (Ct. App. 1988); Eldridge v. Aztec Well
Servicing Co., 105 N.M. 660, 735 P.2d 1166.
286. Baca v. Bueno Foods, 108 N.M. 98, 766 P.2d 1332; Lea County Good Samaritan Village
v. Wojcik, 108 N.M. 76, 766 P.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1988); Mares v. Valencia County Sheriff's Dep't,
106 N.M. 744, 749 P.2d 1123 (Ct. App. 1988).
287. Davis v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 108 N.M. 587, 775 P.2d 1304 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
108 N.M. 433, 773 P.2d 1240 (1989); Montney v. State ex rel. State Highway Dep't, 108 N.M.
326, 772 P.2d 360 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 433, 773 P.2d 1240 (1989); Eldridge v. Aztec
Well Servicing Co., 105 N.M. 660, 735 P.2d 1166.
288. 105 N.M. 660, 735 P.2d 1166.
289. Id. at 661, 735 P.2d at 1169.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 663, 735 P.2d at 1169.
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employer's knowledge of the accident. 292 Since both the worker and
the employer did not perceive the extent of the injury, or the existence
of an emergency, the employer did not fail to provide emergency
treatment. 293
The Eldridge court also considered whether the worker was entitled
to reimbursement for unauthorized medical services. On the day of
the second incident, the worker saw a chiropractor before notifying
his employer. 294 The employer, after being informed of the injury,
gave the chiropractor notice that it would not pay for further treatments
and instructed the worker to see a company-authorized doctor. 29 The
worker later discontinued seeing the employer's doctors and resumed
treatment with the chiropractor. 296 The worker then attempted to recover the expenses paid to the chiropractor. 297 The court held that
since the employer provided adequate and reasonable medical services,
298
the employer was not required to pay for the unauthorized charges.
The court reasoned that the employer provided reasonable and adequate
medical services under the circumstances because the employer furnished
medical services as soon as it knew treatment was necessary. 299 The
case was not one where the employer was late in asserting its statutory
right or where the medical services were inadequate. 3°° Thus, in Eldridge, there was no exception to the rule that a worker is precluded
from seeking independent medical treatment when the employer is
willing to provide treatment and actively makes medical services available.3 01
In Baca v. Bueno Foods,30 2 the court of appeals again addressed
whether a worker was entitled to recover medical expenses for unauthorized medical services. In Baca, a worker who injured her finger
was examined by three doctors furnished by the employer. 0 3 The worker
made no complaint to the doctors about a back injury but independently
obtained chiropractic services for the back injury.3 0 4 First, the court
found that the medical expenses, based on the chiropractor's bill, were
reasonable charges.3 05 In workers' compensation cases, chiropractor's
bills are considered prima facie proof of reasonable charges.30 6 Second,

292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 664, 735 P.2d at 1170.
295. Id. at 662, 735 P.2d at 1168. The employer's insurer paid for the two initial visits to the
chiropractor. Id.
296. Id. The chiropractor also referred the worker to a physician who ordered hospitalization,
tests, and physical therapy. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 664, 735 P.2d at 1170.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 662, 735 P.2d at 1168.
302. 108 N.M. 98, 766 P.2d 1332 (Ct. App. 1988).
303. Id. at 103, 766 P.2d at 1337.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 103-04, 766 P.2d at 1337-38.
306. Id. at 104, 766 P.2d at 1338.
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the court found the chiropractor's bill also constituted prima facie
evidence that the services were reasonably necessary. 0 7 Third, the court
addressed whether the worker gave the employer a reasonable opportunity to furnish medical services and whether the employer provided
adequate medical services.30 8 The court remanded the case for further
determination because the basis of the hearing officer's ruling was
ambiguous.30 9 In New Mexico, a worker must first give the employer
unless the medical
a reasonable opportunity to furnish medical services
310
services offered by the employer are inadequate.
When a party seeks to recover medical expenses in a workers'
compensation or subsequent injury proceeding, that party bears the
burden of proving the expenses were reasonably necessary and directly
related to the worker's disability.3 1' A court of appeals panel addressed
whether stipulations of medical expenses between claimants, employers
(or their insurers), and the Fund were sufficient proof that the medical
expenses were reasonably necessary and directly related to the injury.
In Lea County Good Samaritan Village v. Wojcik, 12 the court of
appeals held that a stipulation of medical expenses dealt only with
the fact of payment and was not proof that the payment was reasonable,
necessary, or directly related to a compensable injury. 13
The courts also specifically addressed the scope of reasonable and
necessary medical expenses. In Davis v. Los Alamos National Laboratories,31 4 the court held that when a less expensive, reasonable alternative is available and would serve the same beneficial purpose, a
more expensive item is an unreasonable and unnecessary medical expense."'
In Montney v. State Highway Department,1 6 a worker suffered a
compensable knee injury, and a medical expert testified that the worker
also suffered from depression due to the injury.31 7 The court held that
the state was required to furnish reasonable and necessary psychological
services to the worker because the psychological condition was causally
related to the accident. 3"18 The court found that medical testimony
319
showed the psychological expenses were necessary and reasonable.

307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 105, 766 P.2d at 1339.
310. Id.
311. Lea County Good Samaritan Village v. Wojcik, 108 N.M. 76, 82, 766 P.2d 920, 926 (Ct.
App. 1988); Mares v. Valencia County Sheriff's Dep't, 106 N.M. 744, 750, 749 P.2d 1123, 1129
(Ct. App. 1988).
312. 108 N.M. 76, 766 P.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1988).
313. Id. at 83-84, 766 P.2d 927-28.
314. 108 N.M. 587, 775 P.2d 1304 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 433, 773 P.2d 1240 (1989).
315. Id. at 589-90, 775 P.2d at 1306-07. In Davis, the court found a jacuzzi tub attachment less
expensive and more reasonable than a hot tub. Id.
316. 108 N.M. 326, 772 P.2d 360 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 197, 169 P.2d 731 (1989).
317. Id. at 331-32, 772 P.2d at 365-66.
318. Id. at 332, 772 P.2d at 366.
319. Id. The state argued that the court failed to find that the knee injury was causally related
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When a worker has a compensable injury, the worker is entitled to
reasonable and necessary future medical expenses.3 20 The court or

hearing officer cannot restrict or limit future expenses once the worker

establishes that he has a compensable injury.3 2' In Beltran v. Van Ark

Care Center, 22 the court considered whether a worker was entitled to

future medical expenses. In Beltran, medical testimony indicated the
worker's permanent knee injury would become worse and future surgery
was probable.3 23 Thus, the trial court's award of future medical expenses
was upheld because the future treatment was reasonable and neces324
sary.
L.

Falsified Employment Application
In several cases, the courts considered whether workers were prevented from recovering under the Worker's Compensation Act or the
Subsequent Injury Act 325 when the employee misrepresented his physical
condition on his employment application.3 26 Generally, in New Mexico,
when a worker provides false information on an employment application regarding the worker's physical condition, the worker may be
barred from recovering workers' compensation or subsequent injury

benefits .327
The New Mexico courts have consistently required an employer to
prove three factors to bar a worker's recovery for falsifying his or
her application. First, the employee must have knowingly and willfully
made a false representation of this physical condition. 28 Second, the
employer must have substantially relied on the false representation
when hiring the employee.3 29 Third, there must be a causal connection
between the false representation and the injury,3 30 established by expert
medical testimony."'

to the mental depression. The court of appeals reasoned that the failure of the trial court to make
an express finding is not fatal to the award when other findings of the trial court are sufficient
to support the ultimate finding on the issue. Id.
320. Graham v. Presbyterian Hosp. Center, 104 N.M. 490, 491, 723 P.2d 259, 260 (Ct. App.
1986).
321. Id.; Beltran v. Van Ark Care Center, 107 N.M. 273, 276, 756 P.2d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 1988).
322. 107 N.M. 273, 276, 756 P.2d 1, 4.
323. Id. at 276, 756 P.2d at 4.
324. Id.
325. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-2-1 to -14 (Repl. Pamp. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1989). For a discussion
of this Act, see infra notes 380-420 and accompanying text.
326. Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight), 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 109 N.M. 33, 781 P.2d 305 (1988); Jaynes v. Wal-Mart Store No. 824, 107 N.M. 648, 763
P.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1988); see also Padilla v. Chavez, 105 N.M. 349, 732 P.2d 876 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied sub nom. Jasso v. Chavez, 105 N.M. 358, 732 P.2d 1381 (1987).
327. See Padilla, 105 N.M. at 351, 732 P.2d at 878 (citing Martinez v. Driver Mechenbier, Inc.,
90 N.M. 282, 562 P.2d 843 (Ct. App. 1977)).
328. Tallman, 108 N.M. at 132, 767 P.2d at 371; Jaynes, 90 N.M. at 283, 562 P.2d at 83.
329. Tallman, 108 N.M. at 132, 767 P.2d at 371; Jaynes, 90 N.M. at 283, 562 P.2d at 83.
330. Tallman, 108 N.M. at 132, 767 P.2d at 371; Jaynes, 90 N.M. at 283, 562 P.2d at 83.
331. Tallman, 108 N.M. at 132-33, 767 P.2d at 371-72 (citing Chavez v. Lectrosonics, 93 N.M.
495, 601 P.2d 728 (Ct. App. 1979)). In Jaynes, the court rejected an argument that the test for
causal connection between the injury and false representation should be based on ability to perform
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In Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight),332 the court resolved
the issue of whether there was a knowing and willfull misrepresentation
by finding no causal connection between the alleged misrepresentation
on the employment application and the worker's injury. Tallman's
claim was for a bulging disk injury resulting from continual lifting
as a dock worker. 33 The employer argued that the worker knowingly
and willfully misrepresented his physical condition, a congenital vertebrae abnormality, on his employment application. 3 4 Both medical
experts who testified agreed that the congenital vertebrae abnormality
and the bulging disk injury were separate and distinct.3 5 No medical
evidence showed a causal connection between the alleged misrepresentation and the worker's compensable injury 3 6 Since no evidence supported a causal connection, the court of appeals upheld the hearing
officer's finding that Tallman did not willfully and knowingly misrepresent his physical condition 3 7 Thus, Tallman was not barred from
recovering under the Workers' Compensation Act.338
In Jaynes v. Wal-Mart Store No. 824,139 the worker attempted to
challenge the hearing officer's finding of a causal connection between
the false representation in her employment application and her injury.340
Jaynes suffered an accidental back injury arising out of and in the
course of her employment with Wal-Mart. 3 4 1 Jaynes also suffered a
back injury at a previous job, but denied any history of back injury
in her employment application with Wal-Mart.3 42 Expert medical testimony established that Jaynes was at an increased risk of injury due
4
to her undisclosed prior injury.1
On appeal, Jaynes argued that recovery for the present injury was
not barred as a result of her false representation, because she was
able to perform the duties of her prior employment, as well as her
work at Wal-Mart without physical difficulties.'4 The court of appeals
rejected the worker's argument. 45 The court upheld the hearing officer's

the same duties in prior employment without physical difficulties. The worker must introduce evidence,
medical expert's testimony, to refute causal connection. Jaynes, 107 N.M. at 649-50, 763 P.2d at
83-84.
332. 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 785, 765 P.2d 768 (1988).
333. Id. at 133, 767 P.2d at 372.
334. Id. at 132, 767 P.2d at 371.
335. Id. at 133, 767 P.2d at 372.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 134, 767 P.2d at 373.
339. 107 N.M. 648, 763 P.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1988).
340. Id. at 649, 763 P.2d at 83.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 649-50, 763 P.2d at 83-84. The worker relied on a test set out in Judge Sutin's
opinion in Chavez v. Lectrosonics, Inc., 93 N.M. 495, 601 P.2d 728 (Ct. App. 1979). The test
established causal connection by proof of a previous disability and medical testimony of an increased
risk of injury or, on the other hand, found no causal connection if the worker could perform the
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finding of a causal connection between the false representation and
the injury because there was substantial evidence supporting the three
percent physical impairment from the previous disability and the worker's increased risk of injury, as established by expert medical testimony.3 46 Furthermore, if the court adopted the worker's argument, it
would have had to inconsistently find 34
both
causal connection3 4 and
8
no causal connection in the same case.
IV.

APPELLATE REVIEW

The New Mexico Legislature granted the Workers' Compensation
Division exclusive jurisdiction over all workers' compensation claims
filed after December 1, 1986.149 In Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best
Freight),310 the court established that the whole record standard of
review applies to review of findings of fact from the Workers' Compensation Division. In Tallman, the court described the whole record
standard as allowing the appellate court to review all the evidence,
both favorable and unfavorable to the findings. 5 ' Only evidence having
little or no worth is disregarded 52 .The court articulated the test as
whether "there is evidence for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate
to support the conclusion reached." 35' 3 In effect, the whole record
standard is the substantial evidence standard applied to the whole

record.354
V.

ATTORNEY FEES

Another aspect of workers' compensation law which underwent drastic change during the survey period was that of attorney fees. The
practitioner must examine each workers' compensation claim to determine which of the several attorney fees provisions apply. The 1959

same duties at her prior employment before applying for the job and was able to perform those
duties at her subsequent employment. Id. at 498, 601 P.2d at 731. Judge Sutin stated this rule was
limited to Chavez, and his opinion was not an opinion of the court under the rule requiring a
quorum. Jaynes, 107 N.M. at 649, 763 P.2d at 83 (citing Casias v. Zia Co., 94 N.M. 723, 616
P.2d 436 (Ct. App. 1980) and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1982)). Of the three-member
panel in Chavez, one judge concurred in the result and one specially concurred. Chavez, 93 N.M.
at 499, 601 P.2d at 732.
346. Jaynes, 107 N.M. at 649, 763 P.2d at 83.
347. See supra text accompanying note 415.
348. Id. at 649-50, 763 P.2d at 83-84.
349. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
350. 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 33, 781 P.2d 305 (1988).
351. Id. at 128, 767 P.2d at 367. Under the substantial evidence standard, governing review of
district court findings of fact, an appellate court will view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the findings and disregard any unfavorable evidence. Nelson v. Nelson Chemical Corp., 105
N.M. 493, 734 P.2d 273 (Ct. App. 1987).
352. Tallman, 108 N.M. at 128, 767 P.2d at 367.
353. Id.
354. Id. The substantial evidence standard of review is modified and supplemented with the whole
record standard of review for findings of fact from administrative agencies. See Duke City Lumber
Co. v. New Mexico Envtl. Improvement Bd., 101 N.M. 291, 681 P.2d 717 (1984).
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Act 3" provided that a worker could collect attorney fees from the
35 6 The Interim Act,33 7
employer as part of the cost of the proceeding.
in effect from July 1, 1986, to June 18, 1987, established restrictions
on the amount of fees that could be awarded to a worker's attorney:
twenty-five percent of the first $5,000 of the award, fifteen percent

of the next $5,000 of the award, and ten percent of the remainder
of the award. The Interim Act also described the particular circum-

stances under which a worker could recover attorney fees.35 Only

under those circumstances, all involving some degree of bad faith on
the part of the employer or carrier, could a worker recover attorney

fees.
The current Workers' Compensation Act, which took effect on June
19, 1987, provides that the employer will pay three-fourths of a worker's
attorney fees while the worker will pay the remaining one-fourth.35 9
A flat $12,500 ceiling applies to an attorney fees award, regardless of
the number of lawyers a worker hires on his behalf.3 60 All the cases
decided during the survey period concerned the 1959 Act or the 1986
Interim Act.3 61 Nonetheless, some of the language in those cases may
help interpret the 1987 Act.

355. 1959 N.M. Laws 196 (effective July 1, 1959).
356. Woodson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 102 N.M. 333, 695 P.2d 483 (1985). Section 52-1-54
(1978) provided that the court should fix the amount of the fee and tax that amount as a part of
the proceeding.
357. 1986 N.M. Laws 547 (effective date July 1, 1986).
358. Act approved Feb. 21, 1986, ch. 22, § 52-3-47C(l), 1986 N.M. Laws 599-600 allows the
worker attorney fees under the following circumstances:
(1) When the worker applied for medical benefits only and the employer refused
to pay those benefits without reasonable basis.
(2) When the employer or carrier acted in bad faith, resulting in economic loss to
the employee.
(3) When the employer denies that an injury occurred then the worker prevails on
that issue at the hearing or trial.
359. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(H) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
360. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(G) (Cum. Supp. 1989) states:
Neither the workers' compensation judge nor the courts on appeal shall award an
amount of attorneys' fees on behalf of a claimant in excess of twelve thousand
five hundred dollars ($12,500). This limitation applies whether the claimant has one
or more attorneys representing him and applies as a cumulative limitation on
compensation for all legal services rendered in all proceedings and other matters
directly related to a single accidental injury to the claimant. The workers' compensation judge may exceed the maximum amount stated in this subsection in
awarding a reasonable attorney's fee if he finds that an employer acted in bad
faith with regard to handling the injured worker's claim and the injured worker
has suffered economic loss as a result thereof. As used in this subsection, "bad
faith" means conduct by the employer in the handling of a claim which amounts
to fraud, malice, oppression or willful, wanton or reckless disregard of the rights
of the worker. Any determination of bad faith shall be made by the workers'
compensation judge through a separate fact-finding proceeding.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(D) (Cum. Supp. 1989) also considers "the failure of a party or parties
to participate in a good faith mannner in informal claim resolution methods adopted by the director"
as a factor in the fee determination.
361. Strong v. Sysco Corp./Nobel Sysco, 108 N.M. 639, 776 P.2d 1258 (Ct. App. 1989); Tallman
v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight), 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 (Ct. App. 1989); Davis v. Los Alamos
Nat'l Lab., 108 N.M. 587, 775 P.2d 1304 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 433, 773 P.2d 1240
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In Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight),3 62 the question before
the court of appeals was whether Tallman's attorney fees award was

made under the wrong statute and, if so, whether the court lacked
jurisdiction to make the award.3 63 Tallman injured his back, apparently

as a result of continuous, heavy lifting.3 64 Tallman claimed the injury
could have occurred at any time since 1977.36 5 The Workers' Compensation Division found that Tallman sustained an injury on September 5, 1986, and awarded him $2,500 in attorney fees. 3 66 Tallman
maintained that the award should have been made under the 1959 Act
rather than under the Interim Act because he suffered pain since 1977.367
attorney fees award would not be tied
Under the 1959 Act, Tallman's
36
to his compensation award. 1
The court of appeals granted Tallman an extension of time to file
a cross-appeal regarding the attorney fees issue, but he failed to file
a docketing statement.3 69 Therefore, his cross-appeal was deemed abandoned, and the court of appeals did not resolve the question on the
that there was jurisdiction to
merits. However, the court did hold
3 70
award fees under the wrong statute.
Strong v. Sysco Corp./Nobel Sysco, 3 7 1 involved the manner of pay-

ment of attorney fees, not the amount. A hearing officer awarded the
worker $67.33 per week in compensation benefits and awarded his
attorney $4,523.95 in attorney fees, to be paid out of the weekly
compensation benefits. 7 2 The attorney complained that he should be
awarded a lump sum deducted from the worker's total award.3 73 The

(1989); Urioste v. Sideris, 107 N.M. 733, 764 P.2d 504 (Ct. App. 1988); Beltran v. Van Ark Care
Center, 107 N.M. 273, 756 P.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1988). Tallman and Strong are discussed in the text.
Davis involved a plaintiff who slipped and fell at work. He asked to be reimbursed for a captain's
chair installed in his truck and a hot tub installed in his home. 108 N.M. at 588, 775 P.2d at
1305. The employer paid compensation but denied that the other expenses were necessary. Id. at
588-89, 775 P.2d at 1305-06. The hearing officer awarded Davis $500, the cost of the captain's
chair. Id. at 589, 775 P.2d at 1306. Prior to the hearing, the employer accepted a recommended
solution to pay Davis an amount greater than $500. Id. at 590, 775 P.2d at 1307. Accordingly,
the court of appeals denied Davis his attorney fees. Id. at 591, 775 P.2d at 1308.
In Urioste, a case decided under the Interim Act, the court precluded an employer from challenging
an attorney fees award unless the employer had submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law.
107 N.M. at 739, 764 P.2d at 510.
In Beltran, a case decided under the 1959 Act, the court held that attorney fees should be
apportioned between successive insurance carriers in a manner reflecting each carrier's liability to
a worker who suffers two, unrelated injuries. 107 N.M. at 276-77, 756 P.2d at 4-5.
362. 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363.
363. Id. at 133, 767 P.2d at 372.
364. Id. at 130, 767 P.2d at 369.
365. Id. at 131, 767 P.2d at 370.
366. Id. at 126, 134, 767 P.2d at 365, 373.
367. Id.
368. 1959 N.M. Laws 219 (effective date July 1, 1959) allowed a court to fix whatever amount
the court deemed reasonable and proper.
369. Tallman, 108 N.M. at 133, 767 P.2d at 372.
370. Id. at 134, 767 P.2d at 373.
371. 108 N.M. 639, 776 P.2d at 373 (Ct. App. 1989).
372. Id. at 640, 776 P.2d at 1259.
373. Id.
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worker would receive the same weekly amount, but for a shorter period
of time.37 4 The court of appeals held that Tallman's hearing officer
acted within his discretion in refusing to award a lump sum award. 75
The Strong court recognized that prorating an attorney fees award
works a hardship on the attorney and could possibly have a chilling
effect on attorneys' desire to represent workers' compensation claim37 6
ants, but the court nonetheless affirmed the hearing officer's decision.
The Interim Act purported to limit an employer's responsibility for
paying compensation to the injured worker.37 7 Just as a lump sum
attorney fee would benefit the recipient by avoiding lost interest or
lost opportunities to use the money, so would a lump sum payment
burden the employer. In Strong, the court stated :hat the burden was
contrary to the spirit of the Interim Act which squarely placed the
burden of paying attorney fees on the worker.3 7 Also, the hearing
officer had discretion to order payment of the award in the manner
79
he thought most consistent with the Interim Act.
VI.

SUBSEQUENT INJURY ACT

A.

Statutory Change
The Subsequent Injury Act38 0 (SIA) underwent significant statutory
revisions during the survey period. The major changes include legislation concerning payments from the Subsequent Injury Fund (the
" ' an enactment
Fund),38
of a period of limitations on claims,38 2 and
legislation governing who may bring a claim against the Fund.3 83

374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 641, 776 P.2d at 1260.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 640, 776 P.2d at 1259.
379. Id. at 641, 776 P.2d at 1260.
380. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-2-1 to -14 (Repl. Pamp. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1989). The Subsequent
Injury Act created the Subsequent Injury Fund for the purpose of encouraging the employment of
the handicapped by equitably adjusting an employer's liability for subsequent injuries. N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 52-2-2 (Cum. Supp. 1989). For a discussion on the requirements of the Act, see Note,
Workmen's Compensation: The Procedural Requirements of the Subsequent Injury Act, Fierro v.
Stanley's Hardware, 18 N.M.L. REv. 269 (1988).
381. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-5(A) (Cum. Supp. 1989); cf. 1988 N.M. Laws, ch. 109, § 3; 1986
N.M. Laws, ch. 22, § 47.
382. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-14 (Cum. Supp. 1989). There was no previous period of limitations.
383. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-5(B) (Cum. Supp. 1989) provides:
Subject to the requirements of Section 52-2-14 NMSA 1978, an employer or its
insurance carrier may assert a claim against the subsequent injury fund under the
following circumstances only:
(1) if a worker asserts a claim against the employer under the Worker's Compensation
Act, the employer or its insurance carrier may join the subsequent injury fund as
an additional party and assert a right to reimbursement from the subsequent injury
fund; and
(2) if the worker is receiving compensation benefits from the employer, the employer
or its insurance carrier may continue to make the payments and file a claim pursuant
to the Subsequent Injury Act against the subsequent injury fund for apportionment
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The 1988 enactment of section 52-2-5(A)(1) of the Act limits the
Fund's reimbursement liability to an employer or its insurance carrier
according to the Fund's apportioned liability.3 8 4 The current provision
encompasses case law preceding the enactment of the provision which
also limited the Fund's liability to its apportioned liability."' When
a worker settles with his employer or its insurer, the Fund is not
bound by the
terms of the settlement.3 86 The Fund's liability must be
3 7
adjudicated. 1

An important statutory development was the enactment of periods
of limitations for the SIA.38 8 In 1988 the New Mexico Legislature
3 89
enacted a two-year period of limitations for claims against the Fund.
Section 52-2-14 requires a claimant against the fund to file within two
years "after the employer receives notice of a compensation claim . ..
or has actual knowledge of a compensation claim." 3 90 The two-year
limitation presumably operates against a worker who files against the

of compensation benefits between the employer or its insurance carrier and the
subsequent injury fund.
See also id. §§ 52-2-5(D) & (E) (Cum.Supp. 1989) (a worker may file a claim against the Fund
only when the employer is no longer doing business in New Mexico or is bankrupt). The previous
statute did not contain any provisions governing who may bring a claim against the Fund. See id.
§ 52-2-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
384. Id. § 52-2-5(A)(1) (Cum.Supp. 1989). In Urioste v. Sideris, 107 N.M. 733, 764 P.2d 504
(Ct. App. 1988), the court held that the employer and carrier at the time of the first accident
remain liable to a claimant for benefits payable to the extent of any future disability resulting from
the initial injury. In Urioste, the subsequent injury was related to the initial injury. Id. at 735,
764 P.2d at 506. The employer and carrier at the time of the second injury are liable for compensation
for the disability resulting from that injury, but that amount is subject to reduction to the extent
of benefits paid or payable for a disability resulting from the first accidental injury. Id. at 738,
764 P.2d at 509.
385. Mares v. Valencia County Sheriff's Dep't, 106 N.M. 744, 749 P.2d 1123 (Ct. App. 1988);
Romero v. Cotton Butane Co., 105 N.M. 73, 728 P.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1986); Duran v. Xerox
Corp., 105 N.M. 277, 731 P.2d 973 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 290, 731 P.2d 1334 (1987).
386. Romero, 105 N.M. at 77, 728 P.2d at 487.
387. See Mares, 106 N.M. at 746, 749 P.2d at 1125.
388. Prior to enactment, there was no specific statute of limitations for claims against the Fund.
An employer's suit against the Fund was governed by the four-year statute of limitations of N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 37-1-4 for "all other actions not ... otherwise provided for and specified by law."
Hernandez v. Levi Strauss, Inc., 107 N.M. 644, 763 P.2d 78 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M.
673, 763 P.2d 689 (1988).
389. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-14 (Cum. Supp. 1989) provides:
A. An employer or its insurance carrier shall assert a claim against the fund within
two years after the employer receives notice of a compensation claim under Subsection
A of Section 52-1-29 NMSA 1978 or has actual knowledge of a compensation claim
under Subsection B of Section 52-1-29 NMSA 1978; otherwise, the employer's claim
and its insurance carrier's claim against the fund are barred.
B. The superintendent of insurance shall be notified in writing by an employer or
its insurance carrier of the employer's or its insurance carrier's intent to file a
claim against the fund at least ninety days before the employer or its insurance
carrier files a claim against the fund. The written notice shall be a condition
precedent to filing any claim. If an employer or its insurance carrier fails timely
to provide the written notice required by this subsection, an employer's claim and
its insurance carrier's claim against the fund are barred.
390. Id. § 52-2-14(A).
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Fund,3 91 since the worker assumes the status of the employer.3 92

In addition to the two-year limitation on claims against the Fund,
the legislature enacted a "notice of claim" requirement. 93 There was
no previous notice requirement. Section 52-2-14(B) now mandates a

ninety-day written notice of "intent to file a claim" for claims against

the Fund.3 94 Failure to submit the written notice will bar a claim

against the Fund.

9

B.

Reduction of Apportioned Liability
In one case during the survey period, Lea County Good Samaritan
Village v. Wojcik, 96 the court of appeals considered whether the Fund

was entitled to a reduction in its apportioned liability for an alleged
payment on a prior injury. Good Samaritan knew the worker was
injured previously when it hired him.3 97 In September 1984, while

working for Good Samaritan, the worker fell from a roof and injured
the same part of the body and same function as was affected by the
initial injury.3 98 At trial, the Fund attempted to reduce its apportioned
liability under section 52-1-47(D) by the amount paid by the previous
employer, Y.M.C.A., for injuries suffered to the same body members
and functions.3 99 The court of appeals upheld the trial court's denial
of a reduction in the Fund's apportioned liability because the Fund
400
did not meet the burden of proof required for a reduction in liability.

391. A worker may bring an action against the Fund only when the employer is no longer doing
business in New Mexico or cannot bring an action against the Fund due to bankruptcy or cessation
of business. Id. § 52-2-5(D) and (E).
392. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-5(D) provides, "The worker takes the place of and assumes the
status of the worker's employer on the claim against the Fund."
393. Id. § 52-1-14(B).
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. 108 N.M. 76, 766 P.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1988).
397. Id. at 79, 766 P.2d at 923.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 80, 766 P.2d at 924; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-47(D) states:
[T]he compensation benefits payable by reason of disability caused by accidental
injury shall be reduced by the compensation benefits paid or payable on account
of any prior injury suffered by the worker if compensation benefits in both instances
are for injury to the same member or function or for disfigurement and if the
compensation benefits payable on account of the subsequent injury would, in whole
or in part, duplicate the benefits paid or payable on account of such prior injury.
400. Lea County, 108 N.M. at 82, 766 P.2d at 926. The Fund must establish:
(1) the extent and nature of the worker's disability at the time of the settlement
of his claim for the prior accidental injury; (2) the amount of the settlement for
the prior injury, including the amount which is attributable to an award for
compensation benefits, and the specific amount, if any, included in the settlement
for payment of medical or vocation rehabilitation benefits, attorney fees, or other
specific benefits; (3) the number of weeks of compensation benefits which were
paid or payable to the worker for permanent or partial disability; and (4) the extent
to which payments for the second injury will duplicate payments previously made
to the worker. The court may also take into consideration any other relevant factors.
Id. at 81, 766 P.2d at 925. The Fund failed to delineate what portion of benefits were allocated
for compensable injuries, future medical expenses, vocational rehabilitation, or other specific benefits.
Id. at 82, 766 P.2d at 926.
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Ordinarily, when a second employer seeks a reduction from reimbursement for payments on a previous injury, the second employer
and the Fund share the burden of proof to establish a right to reduction. 40 1 However, in Lea County, Good Samaritan withdrew its
request for a reduction in liability. 40 2 In that situation, the Fund must
establish its right to a reduction and the amount by a preponderance
of the evidence. 40 3 In Lea County, the prior settlement agreement
between the worker and the first employer did not contain any itemized
amounts of expenses or apportionment. 40 4 Since the Fund did not offer
any other proof for a reduction in benefits, the Fund did not meet
its burden of proof.0 5
C.

Post-Judgment Interest
In Mares v. Valencia County Sheriff's Department,4 6 the court of
appeals addressed the question of post-judgment interest under the
SIA, an issue of first impression in New Mexico. 40 7 The Fund argued
it was a state entity for the purpose of a statutory exemption from
an award of interest in civil cases. 408 However, because of the remedial
nature of the SIA and its beneficent purposes, the court concluded
the legislature intended to permit the trial court to allow interest on
benefits owed to a worker. 40 9 The court held that the trial court in
its discretion could allow interest on compensation benefits payable
by the Fund, subject to the limitation that such interest be allowed
410
for the portion of judgment against the Fund in favor of the worker.
The court also concluded that any post-judgment interest from the
41
Fund does not commence to run until the time set for the payment. 1
D. Certificate of Preexisting Impairment
The SIA requires an employer to file a certificate of preexisting
impairment for apportionment of liability under the SIA. 41 2 The filing
requirement serves a dual purpose. First, the certificate gives an em-

401. Id. at 80, 766 P.2d at 924.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 82, 766 P.2d at 926.
406. 106 N.M. 744, 749 P.2d 1123 (Ct. App. 1988).
407. Id. at 751-52, 749 P.2d at 1130-31; see Lea County, 108 N.M. 76, 766 P.2d 920 (Ct. App.
1988) (Fund is not liable for the post-judgment interest on amounts of reimbursement payable to
either the employer or its insurer).
408. Mares, 106 N.M. at 751, 749 P.2d at 1130; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-4(D) (Repl. Pamp.
1986) (specifically exempting the state from payment of post-judgment interest).
409. Mares, 106 N.M. at 75, 749 P.2d at 1130 (citing Vaughn v. United Nuclear Corp., 98 N.M.
481, 486-87, 650 P.2d 3, 8-9 (Ct. App. 1982)); cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-1 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
The legislature stated that the Workers' Compensation Act and the Occupational Disease Disablement
Law were not remedial in any way and that liberal construction does not apply to interpretations
of those particular statutory sections. Id. § 52-5-1 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
410. Mares, 106 N.M. at 751, 749 P.2d at 1130.
411. Id. at 752, 749 P.2d at 1131.
412. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-6 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
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ployer notice of a preexisting injury and, second, the certificate documents the nature and extent of the impairment.4 13 The certificate
requirement also promotes the hiring of the handicapped by allowing
the employer to limit its liability for a worker's second injury.41 4 The
1988 amendment to the certificate provision made sections A and D
consistent and now requires filing a certificate before the SIA will
apply. 41 5 The 1988 amendment provides:

A. Subject to the limitations on the applicability of the Subsequent
Injury Act in Subsection D of this section, any worker may file
and any employer may require a worker as a condition of employment or continued employment to file with the superintendent
of insurance a certificate of pre-existing permanent physical impairment.
D. The Subsequent Injury Act shall only be applicable to a disability
arising out of an accident or occurrence taking place after the date
a certificate of pre-existing impairment41 6exists, is executed and filed
with the superintendent of insurance.
The prior provision allowed a worker to file "at any time" and
permitted the SIA to apply when the certificate was executed but not
filed.41 7 The revision's execution and filing requirement eliminates the
actual knowledge exception to timely filing of preexisting impairment
certificates .418
The effect of the amendment is to allow a reduction in an employer's
liability only when a preexisting injury or impairment is known and
a certificate is on file. 41 9 The revision also obligates employers to file
certificates before the second injury. If an employer hires a worker

413. Padilla v. Chavez, 105 N.M. 349, 351, 732 P.2d 876, 878 (Ct. App.), cert. denied sub nom.
Jasso v. Chavez, 105 N.M. 358, 732 P.2d 1381 (1987).
414. Id. at 350, 732 P.2d at 877 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-2 (1978)).
415. The prior inconsistency between section (D) and section (A) permitted certificates to be filed
and executed after a second injury if the employer had actual knowledge of the preexisting impairment.
Fierro v. Stanley's Hardware, 104 N.M. 50, 716 P.2d 241 (1986); Duran v. Xerox Corp., 105 N.M.
277, 731 P.2d 973 (Ct. App.), cert. denied sub nom. Jasso v. Duran, 105 N.M. 290, 731 P.2d
1334 (1987); Vaughn v. United Nuclear Corp., 98 N.M. 481, 650 P.2d 3 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed,
98 N.M. 478, 649 P.2d 1391 (1982).
416. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-2-6(A) and (D) (Cum. Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
417. Prior to the 1988 amendment subsections (A) and (D) provided:
A. Any worker may at any time file and any employer may require a worker as
a condition of employment or continued employment to file with the superintendent
of insurance a certificate of pre-existing permanent physical impairment.
B. In the event the certificate of pre-existing permanent physical impairment certifies
that the impairment exists, the Subsequent Injury Act shall be applicable to any
disability arising out of an accident or occurrence taking place after the date a
certificate is filed.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-2-6(A) and (D) (Repl. Pamp. 1987) (emphasis added).
418. During the survey period, several cases analyzed and applied the actual knowledge exception
under the prior version of this section, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1987). See Padilla
v. Chavez, 105 N.M. 349, 732 P.2d 876; Duran v. Xerox Corp., 105 N.M. 277, 731 P.2d 973.
Under the current provision, the actual knowledge doctrine as developed in these cases is no longer
valid.
419. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-6 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
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who suffered a previous injury but the employer did not have knowledge
of that injury, the employer may attempt to eliminate his liability
through the falsified employment application defense. 420 The revision
of section 52-2-6 clearly made major changes in certificate requirements,
the actual knowledge doctrine, and the basis for reimbursement from
the Fund.
VII.

OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE DISABLEMENT LAW

1
The New Mexico Occupational Disease Disablement Law 42 (ODDL)

provides compensation for work-related diseases as opposed to the
422
accidental injuries compensated under the Workers' Compensation Act.
The ODDL mandates that an injury cannot be compensable as both
a work-related injury and an occupational disease. 423 Further, the ODDL
and common diseases
also distinguishes between occupational diseases
4 24
otherwise not associated with employment.

In Cisneros v. Molycorp,425 the court of appeals articulated the
distinction between accidental injuries and occupational diseases. In
Cisneros, the worker suffered a gradual loss of hearing from continuous
exposure to excessive noise.4 26 The worker was prescribed hearing aids
in 1984 and informed his foreman that the hearing loss was workrelated.4 27 In 1987, the worker brought a workers' compensation claim
against Molycorp. 421 The employer argued that the worker was not
entitled to benefits because the hearing loss was an occupational
429
disease.
Because the gradual, noise-induced hearing loss was an unforeseen
result of the worker's routine performance of duties, the court concluded that the hearing loss was an accidental injury.4 30 In distinguishing
between occupational diseases and accidental injuries, the court applied

420. Jaynes v. Wal-Mart Store No. 824, 107 N.M. 648, 763 P.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1988); Padilla
v. Chavez, 105 N.M. 349, 351, 732 P.2d 876, 878. For a general discussion of the falsified employment
application defense, see supra notes 325-48 and accompanying text.
421. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-3-1 to -60 (Repl. Pamp. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
422. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-3-46 (Cum. Supp. 1989) provides:
In all cases where injury results by reason of an accident arising out of or in the
course of employment, no compensation under the New Mexico Disease Disablement
Law shall be payable nor shall any compensation under the Workers' Compensation
Act [Chapter 52, Article 1 NMSA 19781 for any occupational disease.
423. Id. § 52-3-46 (Cum. Supp. 1989). This statute prevents double recovery. Martinez v. University
of Cal., 93 N.M. 455, 601 P.2d 425 (1979); Cisneros v. Molycorp, 107 N.M. 788, 790, 765 P.2d
761, 763 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 785, 765 P.2d 758 (1988).
424. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-3-33 (Repl. Pamp. 1987) provides: "[An] 'occupational disease'
includes any disease peculiar to the occupation in which the employee was engaged and due to
causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment."
425. 107 N.M. 788, 765 P.2d 761 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 785, 765 P.2d 758 (1988).
426. Id. at 790, 765 P.2d at 763.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 791-93, 765 P.2d at 764-66.
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only a foreseeability test. 43' If the injury was not foreseeable,
it was
4 2
an accidental injury and not an occupational disease. 1
In determining whether a disease is occupational, the courts must
determine whether there is a recognizable link between the disease and
some distinctive feature of the job. 433 In Chadwick v. Public Service
Co. of New Mexico, 43 4 the court of appeals applied the recognizable
link test to a situation where a worker suffered from a rash while he
was working at a power generating station. 435 After the worker stopped
43 6
working at the generating station the rash eventually disappeared.
The trial court found the rash was caused by an airborne substance
at the generating station, although no one was able to identify the
substance causing the allergy. 4 37 The court of appeals upheld the trial
court's conclusion that the allergy was a disease, but held it was not
a compensable occupational disease. 43 The court of appeals reasoned
that an allergy caused by airborne substances found in the workplace,
but not as a result of carrying out the occupation, is not a compensable
occupational disease.4 39 The disease must result from the nature of the
occupation, not from the conditions of the workplace." 0 Furthermore,
the worker's ability to perform the same work elsewhere precluded
his eligibility to receive occupational disease compensation. 441
In Tapia v. Springer Transfer Co.,442 the court of appeals decided
within what time limitation a surviving dependent spouse may sue for
death benefits resulting from an occupational disease. In Tapia, the
dependent of a worker who died from silicosis filed for benefits one
year after the worker died, but sixteen years after his last day of
employment. 443 Section 52-3-1O(B)(3) of the ODDL states that an employer is not liable "for death from silicosis . . . unless the death
results within two years from the last day upon which the employee
actually worked for the employer" and within five years if the death

431. Id. at 792, 765 P.2d at 765. New Mexico has rejected additional tests such as the specific
time, place and cause requirements. The various jurisdictions are split on how to distinguish an
accidental injury from an occupational disease, which has lead to different results for nearly identical
situations. See id. (citing Martinez v. Taylor Forge & Pipe Works, 174 Ind. App. 514, 368 N.E.2d
1176 (1977)).
432. Cisneros, 107 N.M. at 792, 765 P.2d at 765.
433. Martinez v. University of Cal., 93 N.M. 455, 457, 601 P.2d 425, 427 (1979); Chadwick v.
Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 105 N.M. 272, 274, 731 P.2d 968, 970 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied,
105 N.M. 290, 731 P.2d 1334 (1987).
434. 105 N.M. 272, 731 P.2d 968 (Ct. App. 1986).
435. Id. at 273, 731 P.2d at 969.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 275, 731 P.2d at 971.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-3-4(A) (Cum. Supp. 1986), amended and recodified at
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-3-4(D) (Cum. Supp. 1989)).
442. 106 N.M. 461, 744 P.2d 1264 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 106 N.M. 405, 744 P.2d 180 (1987).
443. Id. at 462, 744 P.2d at 1265.
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occurs during a period of continuous disablement, and a claim 444is filed
with the director or compensation has been paid or awarded.
The spouse argued that her claim was timely under section 52-342(C) 45 of the ODDL which requires dependents to file claims for
death benefits from an occupational disease within one year after the
date of death." 6 The court held that if the time limits of section 523-10(B)(3) are not met, the claim is untimely, even if the dependent
filed within one year of death pursuant to section 52-3-42(C)." 7 The
spouse argued that the time for filing her claim was tolled under
section 52-3-25 by the "course of conduct" of the employer and the
insurer. 44 8 She further argued this was a genuine issue of fact and
appealed the summary judgment denying her claim. 449 The court of
appeals stated the issue was not material and the supporting affidavit
contained inadmissable hearsay.4 5 0 Section 52-3-25 tolls the time requirement for notice and filing under section 52-3-16(B). 45 ' The court
conceded that section 52-3-25 may result in the case being governed
by the five-year, rather than the two-year, limitation.4 5 2 Section 52-345 3
10(B)(3), however, establishes a "condition precedent" to recovery.
In Tapia, the conditions of section 52-3-1O(B)(3) were not met because
the death from silicosis occurred sixteen years after the last day of

employment .454
Cases construing the ODDL did not alter or expand the rules distinguishing occupational diseases from either accidental injuries or
diseases not associated with the occupation. The difficulty in most
cases is not whether a disease is compensable, but whether
it is com45
pensable as an accidental injury or occupational disease.
NORMAN D. EWART
GREGORY D. STEINMAN
LUIS E. ROBLES, Ed.

444. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-3-10(B)(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
445. Id. § 52-3-42(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
446. Tapia, 106 N.M. at 463, 744 P.2d at 1266.

447. The court noted the irony that the decedent's ability to survive in spite of his disabling
disease for sixteen years was fatal to his widow's claim. Id.
448. Id. at 462, 744 P.2d at 1265. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-3-25 provides that benefits shall not
be denied for failure to give timely notice or file a timely claim through conduct of the insurer
or the employer. For a discussion of tolling by "course of conduct" under the Workers' Compensation
Act, see supra notes 267-78 and accompanying text.
449. Tapia, 106 N.M. at 463, 744 P.2d at 1266.
450. Id.
451. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-3-16(B) bars any recovery if a worker fails to provide notice under
section 52-3-19 or if the worker fails to file a timely claim and give actual notice.
452. Tapia, 106 N.M. at 463, 744 P.2d at 1266.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. See Cisneros v. Molycorp, 107 N.M. 788, 765 P.2d 761 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M.
785, 765 P.2d 758 (1988); Chadwick v. Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 105 N.M. 272, 731 P.2d 968
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 290, 731 P.2d 1334 (1987).

